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Abstract

There are many cases where people do not want or cannot deploy an infrastructurebased network, e.g. using PDAs to distribution documents in a conference, network
for battlefield soldiers, etc.. Wireless ad-hoc networks are needed in these cases. With
wireless ad-hoc networks, users can get connected with each other, anytime, anywhere.
Along with this convenience, users should also be aware that wireless ad-hoc networks,
without the support from infrastructure, are weak against adversaries’ attacks. The
security problems that were previously dealt with in traditional networks, now have to
be addressed again.
This thesis aims to provide a secure communication channel for wireless ad-hoc
networks users. This can be achieved by providing two fundamental cryptographic
schemes: Encryption/Decryption and Digital Signature. By encrypting the content
of communication, users can assure that even the communication is eavesdropped by
adversaries, they can not obtain any information. The challenge is how do you setup
the required encryption/decryption keys for each user efficiently, where there is no
support from infrastructure. We provide a solution in this thesis. On the other hand,
digital signatures provide a way for users to authenticate others within the network.
When a suspicious user wants to join the network group, decision can be made if he
can not provide a valid signature. These schemes provided in this thesis , give wireless
ad-hoc network users a secure communication environment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Wireless, a paradigm shift

“Wireless communication” is not a term given only to widely used digital communication inventions like Wi-Fi [77] and Bluetooth [13] nowadays. If we look at and
trace through the history of computer networks [71], it would date back to 1901, when
the father of radio, Guglielmo Marconi [73], first successfully sent a wireless telegraph
across the Atlantic using Morse Code. Soon after, the Titanic tragedy alerted people
to the fact that a wireless communication system had to be developed and installed on
ships and shore stations to prevent further disasters. Since then, the development of
wireless communication has never stopped. Military applications have also driven the
development. The research project looking into packet radio networks (PRnet) [39] was
carried out in the 1970s by the American Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA) to provide a wireless communication network on the battlefield for soldiers,
and was an early model of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) [72]. Later on, in the
process of designing the standard for wireless local area networks (WLAN) [36] in the
mid 1990s, also known as the 802.11 standard, the IEEE replaced the term PRnet with
wireless ad-hoc network. It is a network that incorporates mobile devices equipped
with 802.11 standard wireless cards to form a network without the need of support
from any network infrastructures (in contrast with infrastructure-based networks like
the Internet and cellular networks), i.e. the network is self-organized and supported by
end users on the network only. Due to the attractiveness of this feature, as well as the
proliferation of portable devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) and notebooks, more and more wireless applications are emerging to facilitate interconnections
between mobile devices. These advancements provide people with the convenience of
being able to get connected with each other, anytime, anywhere.

1
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2

Research Opportunities

There are many types of networks [71]. We divide them into two categories: infrastructurebased networks (or simply traditional networks) and non-infrastructure-based networks
(usually referred to as wireless ad-hoc). In traditional networks, support of the infrastructures is required in various ways. Some services and entities, for example routing
service, domain name system (DNS), certification authority (CA), key generation center (KGC) and trusted third party (TTP) are needed to provide support for the running
of traditional networks. Their availability (service time, location, signal range, signal
quality, etc.) greatly restricts the mobility of the networks. Wireless ad-hoc networks,
on the other hand, without this limitation, can be formed freely at anytime, anywhere
and for any purpose. Together with the popularity of mobile devices, mobility of wireless ad-hoc networks has greatly increased. In some network settings, frequent joining
and leaving of mobile devices is allowed. Maximum mobility is attained thanks to
these features. These kinds of networks can be called dynamic wireless mobile ad-hoc
networks (more detail in chapter 2.2). However, the lack of infrastructure and selforganized nature of these networks bring back the network problems [56, 35, 82] that
have been solved in traditional networks. Networking issues such as routing, security,
network address translation and error correction were previously dealt with in traditional networks, and now have to be addressed again for wireless ad-hoc networks.
Furthermore, new networking issues like the hidden terminal problem and power management [56, 35], which have not been encountered before in traditional networks, arise
to provide new challenges for researchers. These networking issues in wireless ad-hoc
networks have provided a lot of research opportunities for researchers. Among all these
issues, we focus on security, which we think is the most important and most challenging
research area pertaining to wireless ad-hoc networks.

1.3

Scope and Limitation

We focus on securing wireless ad-hoc networks by providing a secure communication
channel for wireless ad-hoc network users in an environment where:
• Each end user is a mobile node (i.e. users are equipped with mobile devices and
are able to move freely within the network)
• The topology of the network changes dynamically over time (i.e. users can join
or leave the network freely at any time)

1.4. Thesis Structure
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There are various means of securing wireless ad-hoc networks [34, 20, 47], like
secure routing protocols, certification systems, credential managements, etc. However,
due to the properties of the network environment that we target in this thesis, many
of these security systems are not suitable for our research. We only focus on the two
cryptographic primitives: encryption/decryption and digital signature(more detail in
chapter 2). Hence we have the following objectives:
1. To provide a secure communication channel for wireless ad-hoc network users
by constructing new encryption/decryption schemes. Users can encrypt their
messages before they broadcast them, such that only the current network group
members have the ability to decrypt these messages to obtain the contents. Nongroup members, previous group members and future group members will not be
able to decrypt these encrypted messages.
2. To provide an authentication system for wireless ad-hoc networks users by constructing new digital signature schemes. Users can mutually authenticate the
validity of membership (in a form of digital signature) of fellow users, such that
a decision on whether or not a new user is allowed to become a group member
can be made.

1.4

Thesis Structure

The rest of this thesis is organized into 6 chapters. In chapter 1 a brief history of the
wireless ad-hoc networks is presented, and research objectives stated. Chapter 2 further
describes some basic concepts regarding the security issues in wireless ad-hoc networks.
We also describe some background knowledge about modern cryptography. Chapter 3
provides the definitions and terminologies that are used throughout this thesis. Some
cryptographic theories that are used in this thesis are also described here. In chapter
4, we present our contributions to encryption/decryption schemes for wireless ad-hoc
networks. A depiction of our digital signature schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks
follows in chapter 5 and 6. The final chapter concludes this thesis and highlights some
future works.

Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Introduction

People with mobile devices can connect to each other easily using wireless ad-hoc
technology. As more and more individuals become familiar with this technology, people
will find more application areas where this technology becomes handy. Most of the time
the contents of wireless communication are not important or may not be of interest to
others outside a particular group, for example, the public FM radio broadcasting and
the use of walkie-talkies within a neighborhood. However in some cases, the contents
have to be protected, e.g. pay TV broadcasting [55, 52, 51]. A secure communication
channel is therefore a must in these cases.
In this chapter, we describe some basic security concepts pertaining to wireless
ad-hoc networks, such as:
• Application areas where a secure communication channel is needed.
• What are the security requirements that are related to building up a secure
communication channel.
• Why is it difficult to set up a secure communication channel for wireless ad-hoc
network users.
• The security goals that we set for this thesis.
The introduction on basic security concepts related to wireless ad-hoc networks
will further help in clarifying our research objectives. Since encryption/decryption and
digital signature are the fundamental primitives in cryptography and the cores of our
research, we will also review some background knowledge about modern cryptography
in this chapter:

4
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• Introduction to the two cryptographic primitives: encryption/decryption and
digital signature
• Symmetric (secret) and asymmetric (public) key cryptosystems [28].
• Some related works on wireless ad-hoc networks that have been done by other
researchers.
• Examples of cryptographic schemes.
The cryptography concepts listed above are used in the later chapters. They will
be revisited again in a more formal way when they are needed in the context. Hence
this is an introductory chapter and the contents will be written in a less formal style
(readers are referred to [50] for more detail in cryptography).

2.2

Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks

Let us first identify the target network environment that we focus on in this thesis. We
have seen this Dynamic Wireless Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks term in chapter 1, which we
refer to a kind of wireless ad-hoc network that allows network users to move/join/leave
freely as they wish. Actually there are wireless ad-hoc networks that are not mobile
[67] and stationary [58]. Those kinds of networks do not have active joining/leaving
activities also (i.e. their network topologies do not change dynamically). Hence we
have to distinguish our target network from these networks.
Another important point to note is, usually wireless ad-hoc networks or mobile
ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are referred to as multihop wireless networks. This means
that mobile hosts will help propagating or to relay wireless signals to other mobile
hosts not covered by the signal range of the source (i.e. signals are hopping from one
host to another). In these networks, routing mechanisms are most important due to
the weak physical protection of mobile hosts (hosts can be hijacked or tampered). A
lot of researches have been done on securing routing protocols (routing issues are not
considered in this thesis, interested readers are refereed to [24]). Selfish mobile hosts
that try to preserve their battery power by not relaying wireless signals is another
problem in such networks [49]. In this thesis, we target on small scale wireless ad-hoc
networks. We assume that all mobile hosts are within one wireless hop from each other.
This means every mobile hosts are covered by the signal range of each other and no
relay is needed. Starting from next chapter, when we say ”wireless ad-hoc networks”,
we refer to the dynamic wireless mobile ad-hoc networks we discussed here.

2.2. Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks

2.2.1
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Applications

Before looking at the security requirements in wireless ad-hoc networks, we will first
identify the application areas where a secure communication channel is needed in order to provide a secure communication environment for wireless ad-hoc network users.
First of all, there are many cases where people do not want or cannot deploy an
infrastructure-based network, i.e. where wireless ad-hoc networks are needed, for example:
• Geographical concern:
– Infrastructures may be destroyed at disaster (floods, earthquakes) sites. A
wireless ad-hoc network can be formed to aid the rescue team during disaster
relief.
– Study groups or expeditions working in areas (volcanos, deserts) away from
any networks.
• User-convenience concern:
– A group of students want to start a meeting or discussion after a class
activity; a wireless ad-hoc network can be formed with their PDAs. In this
case, the school does not need to install terminals in every classroom.
– Document distribution in a conference and wireless network gaming are cases
where no infrastructures are needed.
– Battlefield soldiers are equipped with mobile devices during an operation to
communicate with team members. In this case, setting up an infrastructure
within the operation area is impossible. It may be compromised, hijacked
or destroyed by the enemies.
Among all these examples, a secure communication channel is of critical importance
in the case of the battlefield. This is why military applications are usually the main
thrust in the advancement of wireless ad-hoc networks. Because of this, when we create
our cryptographic schemes in this thesis, we always refer to this battlefield example
as the application scenario for our schemes. Of course, the need for a secure communication channel is not limited to this battlefield example. In the business world, the
presentation of proposals during conference meetings is also a security critical instance.
Wireless ad-hoc network users should always assume that there are adversaries nearby
eavesdropping over the networks.

2.2. Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks

2.2.2
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Security Requirements

As mentioned before, adversaries or misbehaving network users (including group members) have to be assumed to exist in wireless ad-hoc networks. Moreover, mobile
devices are usually equipped with limited resources, e.g. battery power, computational
power, etc.. These are also taken into consideration when considering the security
requirements in wireless ad-hoc networks. To sum up the security requirements being
considered by researchers [82, 66, 62, 41], these are the common important aspects that
have been addressed:
• Availability: this guarantees that the network will survive even with the presence
of some malicious users.
• Confidentiality: this ensures that the message content is never disclosed to unauthorized users.
• Integrity: this ensures that the message content being broadcasted is not corrupted.
• Authenticity: this ensures that the network users can identify the origins of each
other.
• Cost Effectiveness: this guarantees that ensuring all the above requirements will
not be significantly more expensive than communicating without them.
When talking about ”cost”, we refer to the network bandwidth consumption plus
the power consumption and CPU consumption of the mobile devices. A secure communication channel for wireless ad-hoc network users should fulfill all the security
requirements above.

2.2.3

Difficulties and Goals

[34, 62, 20, 47, 74] have mentioned different security difficulties faced by wireless ad-hoc
networks. To illustrate these difficulties, we consider the following scenario:
Assume that there is a group of soldiers on a battlefield with mobile devices
equipped. They want to form a wireless ad-hoc network using their devices to
communicate with team members during an operation. There are enemies around
them who are also equipped with mobile devices. The enemies can eavesdrop on the
communication within the soldiers’ network. The operation is to find a wounded
soldier and escort him back to home base.

2.2. Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
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When a wireless ad-hoc network is formed in an open environment, all intended
and unintended persons can listen to and observe the broadcasted communication
with their mobile devices. Unlike wired networks, wireless signal cannot be simply
hidden underground through cables. In the above scenario, enemies can easily listen
to the soldiers’ communication if there is no secure communication channel in the
network. Security is crucial in this environment. Therefore, the communication must
be protected so that only network group members in the wireless ad-hoc network group
can obtain the content. This is where confidentiality and integrity are addressed.
Mobile devices have limited battery capacity and less powerful CPUs, thus the
workload involved in maintaining the network should be divided equally among users.
It is not recommended for wireless ad-hoc networks to have central hosts, since these
usually act as network coordinators, which would mean heavier workload and higher
power consumption. In the above scenario, once the host is identified by the enemies,
capturing or eliminating him would result in the breakdown of the network. This is
where availability and cost effectiveness are addressed.
The lack of support from infrastructure in wireless ad-hoc networks also makes it
difficult for the security services in traditional networks to be migrated and adopted.
Certification authorities (CAs) are needed in traditional networks to identify and authenticate entities. An enemy may impersonate the wounded soldier in the above
scenario. His origin has to be authenticated before he is allowed to join the team. This
is where authenticity is addressed.
From a network architecture perspective, entrusted network hosts and user rights
management can also help securing the network [34, 20, 47]. These methods are considered to be more structural oriented, i.e. the network is well designed before these
methods can be deployed. Instead of going into a more structural research, we, however,
would like to limit ourselves to two cryptographic primitives: encryption/decryption
and digital signature. The reason is simple: Once the primitives are built, they can
be combined with any higher level structural designs to construct any system specific
applications. Hence we have set the following security goals in this thesis:
• Our encryption/decryption schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks must fulfill the
availability, confidentiality and integrity requirements.
• Our digital signature schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks must fulfill the authenticity requirement.
• Both of them have to be cost effective.

2.3. Cryptography

2.3
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Cryptography

In this section, we will introduce the two cryptographic primitives and look at some
relevant works that have been done on securing wireless ad-hoc networks. We will
divide this section into two parts: First we review the basics of encryption/decryption,
followed by some researches on encryption/decryption schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks. Then we look at the basics of digital signature. These reviews will help to
clarify the research direction of current literatures. A conclusion at the end will summarize the contributions from the other researchers and point out the gap in research
for which our research can fill up.

2.3.1

Encryption/Decryption Schemes

Basics of Encryption/Decryption
In order to protect the content of communication, messages being sent out, known as
the plaintext, are encrypted by an encryption function using an encryption key. After
the encryption, the messages become a chunk of meaningless data, called ciphertext. It
can only be transformed back to the original messages with a decryption function using
the appropriate decryption key. If the encryption key and the decryption key here are
the same key, we call it a symmetric or secret key cryptosystem; if different keys are
used, we call it an asymmetric or public key cryptosystem. Usually, researchers will use
the following notations in their researches:
C = Ek (M ), M = Dk (C) and Dk (Ek (M )) = M where k : key, M : plaintext,
C : ciphertext, E( ) : encryption f unction, D( ) : decryption f unction
The equations suggest that D, E will cancel out each other and we can be sure that
M is not affected after the calculations. In secret key cryptosystem, all the users will
use the same key, known as the secret key, for both encryption and decryption. While
in public key cryptosystem, each user will have two different keys, which come as a
pair. The decryption key is called the private key: It is owned by the key pair holder
only and is used for decrypting messages sent to him; The encryption key is called
the public key: It is public to everyone for encrypting messages to the corresponding
private key holder.

2.3. Cryptography
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Public Key Cryptosystem
The idea of public key cryptosystem was first proposed by Ellis in 1970 and a workable
implementation was accomplished by Cocks in 1973 [64]. It was termed non-secret
encryption at that time but the findings were kept secret until 1997 [30]. Few years
later, Diffie and Hellman published their public key cryptosystem idea in 1976 [28] but
a workable implementation was not yet done. Here is a simple diagram that illustrates
their idea:

Public (insecure)
channel

Alice
Public Key
(pkBob)

C = Epk(M)
Plaintext
(M)

Public Key (pkBob)
Cyphertext (C)

Bob
Private Key
(skBob)

M = Dsk(C)

Adversary

Plaintext
(M)

Figure 2.1: Public Key Cryptography
Usually, researchers will use ”Alice” and ”Bob” to represent two parties communicating using cryptographic protocols. In this case, Bob has generated a pair of private
and public keys. He publishes his public key through a public channel, where everyone,
including the adversaries, can obtain it. Alice wants to send a message to Bob. She
acquired Bob’s public key and encrypts the message with it. The ciphertext is then
sent through the public channel again. Bob, who is the unique owner of his private
key, can decrypt the ciphertext and obtains Alice’s message. Adversaries without this
private key will not be able to obtain this information unless they break the encryption/decryption schemes. Because of this, researchers will choose some hard (known to
be unsolvable) problems in mathematics as the bases of their schemes to build up their
cryptosystems (method to relate cryptosystems with computational hard problems will
be discussed in more detail in chapter 3). We will take the RSA cryptosystem [61] as
an example below. It was constructed by three researchers (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
at M.I.T in 1977 [59] and it was the first workable public key cryptosystem inspired
by the idea of Diffie and Hellman. It is the most widely used public key cryptosystem
nowadays.
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RSA Encryption/decryption
We follow the same notations above. There are two parties: Alice and Bob. The
following calculations will be carried out in order, such that Alice can send a message
securely to Bob.
Key Generation:

1. Bob chooses two large prime p and q.
2. Compute n = p · q and z = (p − 1) · (q − 1).
3. Pick a random integer d that is relatively prime to z.
4. Compute the integer e such that e · d = 1 mod z.
5. Publish the public key pkBob = (n, e) and keep the private
key skBob = (p, q, d) secret.

Encryption:

1. Alice acquires pkBob and prepares a message M < n.
2. Compute and send the ciphertext C = M e mod n to Bob.

Decryption:

1. Bob receives C and computes M = C d mod n.

Notice that C d = M e·d mod n, hence Bob can obtain the message from Alice. The
underlying hard problem in mathematics of this encryption/decryption scheme is the
difficulty of factoring n (readers are referred to [59] for more detail). This is an example
on how researchers build their encryption/decryption schemes. Basically there are at
least three procedures: Key generation, encryption and decryption. Our schemes also
follow these procedures. We will now introduce some encryption/decryption schemes
in wireless ad-hoc networks.
In wireless ad-hoc networks, the majority of researches go for symmetric key cryptosystems to build their encryption/decryption schemes. These schemes are known as
key agreement schemes (sometimes also called key management schemes or key establishment schemes). We will review some of them below.
Key Agreement Schemes
Key agreement schemes provide a secure method to manage the symmetric key that
is used in encryption and decryption by the wireless ad-hoc network group members.
This key of the group (or group key) can be either distributed by one of the entrusted
member or composed by all of the members depending on the key agreement method of
the scheme. Although distributing a group key is possible to let every group members
to have the same key, it is unrealistic to find a member who is trusted by all the
others. Hence the distribution is usually done by a terminal computer and all the
group members have to connect their mobile devices physically to that terminal to
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download the same group key. This limits the mobility of the network whenever a new
group key is needed. It is only suitable in a scenario where mobility is not of great
concern, for example a conference meeting inside an office. Hence researchers do not
have great interest in this type of key agreement scheme.
The other way to let every group members to hold the same group key can be done
by contributory composition. Many researchers [68, 7, 2, 4, 42, 17, 45, 9, 79, 12, 6]
have proposed their own schemes, which differ in the way to compose the group key
using different mathematical calculations. Most of these schemes, like [68, 7, 2, 4, 42,
79, 12] are extended from the well known public key exchange protocol: Diffie-Hellman
protocol (DH protocol) introduced in [28]. The basic idea to compose the group key is
like this:
1. There are n members. Each member i chooses a random secret number xi .
2. Each of them will hide their secret number xi with a function E(). E() has a
property that E(xi )xi+1 = E(xi · xi+1 ) where xi+1 is the secret number of next
member.
3. Each of the members will broadcast their own E(xi ) to the other members.
4. Upon receiving a E(xi ) value from another member, one will add his own secret
number xi+1 into E(xi ) to create E(xi · xi+1 ). This value is then broadcasted to
the other members.
5. After some rounds, each member has participated in the protocol and has contributed to the group key composition. The final composed value will become
E(x1 · x2 · ... · xn ). This value is the same for every one and will be used as the
common group key.
These are the general steps that each of the key agreement schemes follow. Different
key agreement schemes from different researchers have different performance in terms
of number of broadcasts and number of calculations. As suggested in [75], the most
efficient way to compose a common group key is to organize the group members in
a hierarchical tree structure. [42, 9, 79] are examples of such composition. We will
use the following diagram to illustrate this tree based composition idea. Notice that
the function E() is replaced by exponential calculation here, i.e. E(x) = g x where g
is a common base generator known by the network group members. It follows that
E(xi )xi+1 = (g xi )xi+1 = g xi ·xi+1 = E(xi · xi+1 ).
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Tree Based Group Key Agreement
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Figure 2.2: Tree Based Group Key Agreement
The network group members above first organize themselves into pairs. Each two
of them will then execute the DH protocol to exchange their secret numbers and come
up with a common secret key. Take member1 as an example: First he chooses a secret
number x1 and then he broadcasts g x1 . The value g x2 is also broadcasted by member2 .
Upon receiving g x2 , member1 adds his secret number x1 into it by raising it to the
power of x1 , i.e. (g x2 )x1 . member2 does the same operation by raising g x1 to the power
of x2 and they come up with the same secret key g x1 x2 . In this stage, each pair of
members shares a common secret key that is known to them only. To group with the
other pair of members, they execute the DH protocol again and the secret numbers
this time are their secret keys. Finally, the network group come up with a common
group key g g

x1 x2 g x3 x4

where they will use as a symmetric group key to encrypt/decrypt

their messages.
Broadcast Encryption Schemes
Differ from the symmetric key cryptosystem in key agreement schemes, broadcast encryption schemes make use of the asymmetric key cryptosystem to provide a secure
communication channel. Unlike the traditional public key cryptosystems where there
are only two parties involved, broadcast encryption schemes allow one encryption and
multiple decryption: a sender encrypts a message, more than one receiver can decrypt
it. Examples like [55, 52, 51, 29]. Broadcast encryption is used in a network environment where there is only a single sender (the broadcaster) and multiple receivers
(the subscribers), in other words, it is an one-to-many network. The broadcaster will

2.3. Cryptography

14

also act as a key generation center who generates all the system parameters and all
the private and public keys required. At the time when a user registers himself to
the network group as a new member, the broadcaster will generate a pair of private
and public keys for him. The public keys in broadcast encryption schemes have two
functions:
1. To encrypt messages such that the corresponding private keys holders can decrypt.
2. To revoke members who are no longer subscribed to the network.
Broadcaster can input or remove members’ public keys from the encryption function
to achieve the two functionalities above.
Although network environment of broadcast encryption is a lot different from the
wireless ad-hoc network environment that we target in this thesis (all of the users are
both senders and receivers, i.e. many-to-many), we found that it is possible to adopt
broadcast encryption techniques into wireless ad-hoc networks during our research.
Based on that, we created our encryption/decryption schemes, which are presented in
chapter 4.

2.3.2

Digital Signature schemes

Basics of Digital Signature Schemes
Digital signatures provide authentication to both person and data. They are mostly
built from public key cryptosystem. When a person (the signer) wants to prove to the
others that a document is approved by him, he will use his private key to ”sign” on the
document. Consider this as a reverse of encryption/decryption scheme. The digitally
signed document now contains the digital signature from this person. If anyone wants
to verify this signature, he will obtain the public key of the signer and perform the
verification using this public key. Since the public key and private key come in pair,
there will not be another key that can produce the same signature. Hence the origin of
the document can be assured. RSA cryptosystem is also capable of producing digital
signatures. Using the same setting before, the only different is that d is used in the
encryption (signing) instead of e and e is used in decryption (verification) instead of d:
?

σ = M d mod n, M = σ e mod n where σ : signature
Verifier will determine if a signature is valid by checking whether M equals to
σ e mod n or not.
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Designated Verifier Signature Schemes
Although basic digital signature serves the purpose to authenticate a person, its usage
in wireless ad-hoc networks may not be appropriated. For an example, if the signed
document is a ticket that allows the holder to join a network. A malicious ticker holder
can simply pass this ticket to anyone, letting an outsider to get into the network. This
will endanger the security of the network and the secure communication channel may
be collapsed as a result. A special type of digital signature is needed for wireless ad-hoc
networks where only a designated person can verify the signature. Since not everyone
can verify the signature, even a malicious ticker holder releases his ticket to a third
person (who is not the designated verifier), this person will have no way to make sure
that if the ticket is a valid one or not. He will not try to use this unverified ticket
to join any network also, because a fake ticket will reveal his attempt instantly. This
prohibits him from using it to join any network. [37, 44, 25, 43] are examples of such
special signature. A common name to describe this type of signature is designated
verifier signature. Researchers try to make the size of signature shorter and try to
create a designated verifier signature scheme that support multiple verifiers at the
same time. Recently only [43] has created a multi-version of this kind of signature. We
have also contributed to this area and created two different multi-version designated
verifier signature schemes, which are described in chapter 5 and 6.

2.4

Conclusion

To secure wireless ad-hoc networks, two schemes have to be constructed: an encryption/decryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. From the current literatures,
key agreement schemes can provide what we need for secure communication. They
enable the group members to compose common group keys on the fly without key predistributions. They have already met the availability, confidentiality and integrity security requirements. However, they are less cost effective than broadcast encryption in
terms of number of messages exchange in system setup time. Key agreement schemes
require every group members to participate in the composition of group key, while
broadcast encryption schemes do not require this. It is easy to see that broadcast encryption schemes have greater flexibility, which helps to keep the network dynamic. The
only flaw is that they work on one-to-many communication but not many-to-many. We
notice that a generalized broadcast encryption scheme that supports multi-directional
communication can fill up this gap of research.
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In searching for a digital signature scheme for wireless ad-hoc networks, we think
that the current researches on designated verifier signature schemes are on the right
track that suit our need (they fulfill the authenticity security requirement). They can
solve the authentication problem and prohibit outsiders from getting into the network.
The remaining research that has to be done is to make the designated verifier signature
scheme cost effective and supports multi-verifier. The work done in [43] supports
multi-verifier but it limits the number of verifiers and is not changeable during the
network session, which is not suitable for wireless ad-hoc networks. We see this as a
gap of research for us to provide some designated verifier signature schemes that can
adaptively select verifiers and support multi-verifier.

Chapter 3
Preliminaries
3.1

Introduction

Recall that this research is aimed at securing wireless ad-hoc networks by providing
encryption/decryption schemes and digital signature schemes for a group of people
who want to form the network using their mobile devices. When designing a new
cryptographic scheme, not only does the scheme have to be achievable and satisfy all
the design requirements, we also require the scheme to be provably secure. Think of
the real world, there are always attackers or adversaries trying to break any system or
scheme so that they can gain extra benefits than other normal users. Therefore, the
scheme must be unbreakable under all circumstances in order to protect those normal
users and maintain a fair environment. In this chapter, we will present some formal
ways to prove a cryptographic scheme secure and some underlying computational hard
problems that we will use to aid the proof. Notice that there are many different ways
to prove a cryptographic scheme secure. The descriptions given in this chapter serve
for general usages only. When we encounter security proofs again in the next chapters,
we will tailor the proofs again to fit our schemes.

3.2

Cryptographic Requirements

Before going into the details of the security proofs, we summarize the major cryptographic requirements on ”What is a secure cryptographic scheme” in this section. We
are focusing on encryption/decryption schemes and digital signature schemes, each of
them has different requirements and will be discussed below.
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Encryption/Decryption Schemes

A secure encryption/decryption scheme should have the following cryptographic requirements:
• One-wayness – Any message (plaintext) should be computationally efficient to
encrypt using the encryption method of the scheme while the encrypted message
(ciphertext) should be computationally infeasible to decrypt without using the
decryption method of the scheme properly with the decryption key.
• Indistinguishable – When two messages are encrypted and the ciphertexts after
encryption are presented, nobody should be able to distinguish which ciphertext
corresponds to which original message without decrypting them.
One-wayness
It is guaranteed by a trapdoor one-way function as generalized in [48]:
Let ft (x) : X → Y be a trapdoor one-way function, then it is computationally
efficient to compute y = ft (x) for all x ∈ X with arbitrary value t. But it is
computationally infeasible to reverse the function to find the corresponding value
x for all y ∈ Y , except when a trapdoor information t is provided. Then for all
y ∈ Y , x = ft (y) can be computed efficiently.
Generally for an encryption/decryption scheme, the trapdoor information t will be
the decryption key and the trapdoor one-way function will be the encryption method.
Hence without knowing the decryption key, it is computationally inefficient to extract
the original plaintext from the ciphertext.
Indistinguishable
It was firstly considered in [31] and later formalized in [11]. One example is when there
are only two options, ”Agree” and ”Not Agree” to choose from as the plaintext. If the
encrypted plaintext always resulted in the same ciphertext, it does not matter even if
the attacker can not decrypt the ciphertext (due to the One-wayness property). The
attacker can always guess the plaintext from the resulting ciphertext. With the indistinguishability property, no ciphertexts will reveal any information about the plaintext.
Hence the attackers can not guess what will be the original plaintext just by observing
the length and/or the result of the ciphertext.
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Digital Signature Schemes

In contrasts to an encryption/decryption scheme, a secure digital signature scheme does
not require to be one-wayness and indistinguishable because there is no ciphertext and
the original plaintext message is always sent together with the digital signature. Hence
what is important for such a scheme is to protect the signature. It should have the
following cryptographic requirement:
• Unforgeable – When a digital signature is released to the public, nobody should
be able to alter the content of the signed document such that the signature is
still valid. Equivalently, nobody should be able to produce a valid signature on
behalf of the signer without knowing his signing key.
Unforgeable
It is formalized in [32] where a digital signature is given to an attacker, his goal is
to forge the signature by any means and the signature verification method will return
”True” on the forged signature. With the unforgeability property, we can guarantee
that the content of the signed document will not be changed and the signature is
generated using the signing key of the signer.

3.3

Security Proofs

When designing our schemes, we have to show that they meet the above cryptographic
requirements by using different security proofs before we can say that our schemes
are secure or attack free. Without formally prove the schemes to be secure, although
the schemes may function properly under a normal run with no misbehaving users,
there may be some unseen weaknesses on the design, making the schemes vulnerable.
Therefore we should always make sure that a cryptographic scheme is secure by applying security proofs. A general idea to prove a cryptographic scheme to be secure is
described in [10]:
1. Decide a security goal (indistinguishability/unforgeability).
2. Setup an experiment of attack between an attacker and a simulated real world
environment.
3. Define what is a secure cryptographic scheme.
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4. Select a computational hard (unsolvable) problem as an underlying theorem.
5. Transform/reduce the experiment to the underlying hard problem.
6. Show that if the attacker wins in the experiment is equivalent to solving the hard
problem.
7. Conclude with a statement that since the hard problem is known to be unsolvable,
the success of the attacker leads to a contradiction and hence such attacker must
not exist and the scheme is proved to be secure.

3.3.1

Experiment for Encryption/Decryption Schemes

The following experiment of attack is setup for proving indistinguishability in encryption/decryption schemes. There is an attacker A and a challenger C who simulates a
real world environment. A is allowed to choose any ciphertext and lets C decrypts.
This kind of attack is called chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) [57]:
1. C generates all the necessary scheme parameters and a pair of encryption/decryption
key. He gives all these values to A and keeps the decryption key secret from A.
2. A can request C to decrypt any ciphertext he chooses. C will use the decryption
key to decrypt the ciphertext and tells A the resulting plaintext.
3. A will select two messages {m0 , m1 } and gives them to C. C will then pick one of
them randomly by flipping a fair coin to obtain b ∈ {0, 1}. C encrypts mb to get
the ciphertext and gives it back to A without letting him knows which message
is being picked.
4. A can keep on requesting C to decrypt any ciphertext he chooses but this time
he can not ask C the ciphertext he obtained in phase 3.
0

5. Eventually A will make a guess b ∈ {0, 1} on which message was being picked
by C in phase 3.
0

If A somehow managed to guess the correct answer (i.e. b = b) then A wins the
experiment of attack. Theoretically the probability for A to win can not be higher than
1
,
2

otherwise, A is gaining advantage from a scheme weakness and hence the scheme is

not secure. Therefore a secure cryptographic scheme should have winning probability
very close to 21 . If A loses in the game, then we say that the scheme is IND-CCA
secure.
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Experiment for Digital Signature Schemes

The following experiment of attack is setup for proving unforgeability in digital signature schemes. It is similar to the experiment for proving indistinguishability but
simpler. Again there is an attacker A and a challenger C who simulates a real world
environment:
1. C generates all the necessary scheme parameters and a signing key. He gives all
these values to A and keeps the signing key secret from A.
2. A can request C to sign any message he chooses. C will use the signing key to
sign the message and tells A the resulting signature.
3. Eventually A will create a signature on a message m that has not been asked to
C in phase 2.
If the signature on m created by A is the same as the signature on m signed by C
then A wins the experiment of attack. Clearly the probability of A’s success must be
negligible for the scheme to be secure.

3.3.3

Computational hard problems

The above experiments have to be transformed/reduced to some predefined computational hard problems in order to complete the security proofs. Instead of showing that
A’s probability of success is small, we will rather try to maximize it and show that
A has a very high probability of winning the experiment (or equivalently solving the
underlying hard problem), which leads to a contradiction and hence A must not have
a high probability of success. There are a few basic computational hard problems in
cryptography:
Discrete-Logarithm Problem
It is an old and famous hard problem in mathematics.
Given a finite cyclic group G = {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n } and a randomly picked value r ∈ G,
find the integer i such that r = g i .
The hardness of DL problem is that there does not exist an efficient algorithm to
compute i. To find i in an inefficient way, we can pre-compute all the values in G to
create a lookup table to find the matching r and obtain the corresponding i.
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Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
It was first used in [28] and is a variant of the DL problem.
Given a finite cyclic group G = {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n } and two values g a , g b ∈ G where
a, b are randomly picked integers, calculate g ab
The hardness of CDH problem is that there does not exist an efficient algorithm to
compute g ab . This can be seen from the DL problem, by giving g a or g b , it is hard to
calculate the value of a or b, hence to calculate (g a )b or (g b )a is also hard.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
It is a variant of the CDH problem.
Given a finite cyclic group G = {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g n } and three values g a , g b , g c ∈ G
where a, b, c are randomly picked integers, decide whether c = ab.
The hardness of DDH problem is that there does not exist an efficient algorithm
to decide whether c = ab. These computational hard problems can be used to aid the
security proofs. The choices of using which problems depend on how the schemes are
designed.

3.3.4

Basic Concepts on Bilinear Pairing

Bilinear pairing is the cryptographic tool that has been used frequently in recent cryptographic applications like [38, 16, 15, 65, 54].
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups with the same prime order q where the discrete
logarithm problem in Z∗q is intractable. We define G1 as a subgroup of an additive
cyclic group of points on an elliptic curve, and G2 as a subgroup of a multiplicative
cyclic group of a finite field. A bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is defined over G1 and
G2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinear : ê(aP1 , bP2 ) = ê(P1 , P2 )ab , ∀P1 , P2 ∈ G1 , a, b ∈ Z∗q
2. Non-degenerate : for all generators P ∈ G1 , ê(P, P ) 6= 1(the identity in G2 )
3. Computable : ∀P1 , P2 ∈ G1 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute
ê(P1 , P2 )
Note that we also have ê(P1 + P2 , P ) = ê(P1 , P )ê(P2 , P ) from the properties above,
such bilinear map that satisfies all these properties is called an admissible bilinear map.
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Conclusion

We presented some major cryptographic requirements that are widely used by researchers in the security proofs for their cryptographic schemes. We also described
some formal methods to prove security, and we reviewed some computational hard
problems in this chapter. These details will help us to construct our schemes in the
following chapters.

Chapter 4
Encryption/Decryption Schemes for
Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
4.1

Introduction

4.1.1

Motivation

Encryption/decryption is usually done with a common group key among the wireless
ad-hoc network group and the broadcasted messages are encrypted and decrypted
using this key. Hence once this key is shared among the group, the communication
is protected and decryption is limited to the group members; once the group key is
exposed, the protection is lost and a new group key for a new session is needed (hence
it is sometimes called group session key). The way that how such group generates and
handles the group session key is called a key agreement scheme [40].
A naive approach is to share the group session key before the network is formed.
The drawbacks of this approach are as follows:
1. This is inefficient when the key needs to be updated.
2. This does not support the frequent joining/leaving of group members in wireless
ad-hoc networks.
3. It is not possible to create a subgroup from the current group.
Every time a group session key is distributed, each of the group members is holding
the same key and once a new member joins the group, it is impossible for the current
group members to give this key to him because there is no secure channel established
with this new member. The current group actually needs to dismiss and regroup but
including the new member this time and share a new group session key. It is the same
case when an old member leaves the current group, in which he still holds the key. He
is able to decrypt the content of communication or give this key to another outsider.
24
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Hence breaking the secure communication channel and the group is needed to regroup
again. This is highly inefficient and does not provide any mean to support the dynamic
feature of wireless ad-hoc networks, hence point 1 and 2. Sometime there is a need to
form a subgroup within the current group so that some classified content are available
to this subgroup only but not the other group members. For this approach to do this,
the members in the subgroup, again, need to leave the current group and regroup as a
new group, which is also highly inefficient and hence point 3.

4.1.2

Related Work

Instead of prior distribution of group session keys [19], traditionally people use public
key exchange protocols, such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol (DH-protocol) [28] to aid
two persons, without prior knowledge of each other, to dynamically create a key that
is only known by them. Using this key, they can start their secure communication.
Although this protocol can only support two parties, some recent researches have shown
that the extension to multiple parties is possible [68, 7, 2, 4, 42, 79, 12] and are used as
key agreement schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks. The drawbacks of this approach
are as follows:
1. The group members have to engage in an extensive message exchange phase when
the key is being constructed.
2. Both the number of calculations and the number of message flows can be large
when a new group session key is required.
3. A leader role is required to initiate the protocol, some of the group members will
have to perform more calculations and work load.
As mobile devices are equipped with limited battery, having to perform a lot of calculations and sending a lot of messages whenever a new group session key is constructed
may not be considered as a good approach as these will use up the battery quicker,
which is point 2. The mobile devices also have different computational power, some
may take longer time to finish the calculations needed in message exchange phase. The
network setup time is lengthen as a consequence of point 1. Point 3 suggests another important issue in wireless ad-hoc networks, the fairness problem. With limited resources,
it is unfair to a group member if he is required to perform more work load or calculations than the others. However, the extensions of DH-protocol in multi-party version
all require one or some group members to take up the leader/sponser/coordinator roles
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to aid in the message exchange phase. This is not encouraged and we think this should
be avoided, every group members should only perform same amount of work load and
calculations when the group session key is being constructed.
Conceptually, the idea proposed in [17, 45] by incorporating multilinear map may
provide an ideal solution to this fairness problem. In their settings, the only work that
each group member has to perform is to provide his own random secret number and
broadcast it to the other group members. With only one broadcast, the group can
construct a new group session key with only one calculation by incorporating the multilinear map. Unfortunately, at this stage, researchers have not successfully shown a
concrete construction of multilinear map and it is still only exists conceptually. While
a multilinear map can not be constructed, a simplified map can. The existing map is
the bilinear map and Joux showed how to extend the DH key exchange protocol into
a tripartite one round version using this map [38]. Barua, Dutta and Sharkar combine
the bilinear map with the DH-protocol to construct a tree-based group key agreement
scheme in [9]. Although, these protocols increased the efficiency of the message exchange phase, the fairness problem still has not been solved yet or is unattended. The
drawbacks of using public key exchange protocols are carried forward.

4.1.3

Contributions of This Chapter

From the best of our knowledge, there exists no key agreement scheme that allows a
group member to join or leave a wireless ad-hoc network efficiently, possible to form
subgroup, and solves the fairness problem. Having considered the drawbacks of using
public key exchange protocols to setup group session keys, we propose a new protocol
which does not require the group members to perform any message exchanges during
the generation process of group key. To achieve this goal, we incorporate the identitybased cryptosystem [63] with a bilinear map and pairing computation [15] to replace
the contributory setup of group key. Each group member is treated as a broadcaster in
which he can select the designated receiver(s)(the whole wireless ad-hoc network group
or part of it) by himself and encrypt the message(key) that is only decipherable by
them. Unlike previous protocols, our scheme avoids massive message exchanges for key
setup that are sent between group members. In short, the extensive message exchange
phase is replaced with exchange of IDs. While the IDs we use are obtainable publicly
like e-mail addresses and usernames, this exchange phase can even be avoided. Each
group member is only required to broadcast one message to setup the group key, and
hence, it is most efficient in terms of message exchanges and it provides fairness to
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every group members. They can also assure that only the designated receiver(s) can
decrypt the message(key). We shall note that our scheme is perfect for a small group
of people who would like to form a wireless ad-hoc network.

4.2

Preliminaries

4.2.1

Identity-Based Cryptosystem

In an identity-based cryptosystem (or ID-based, for short) [63], users are not bound to
certificates and no online certificate authorities (CA) are required to verify the validity
of the users’ certificates. They are bound to their unique IDs and their private keys are
obtained from a key generation center (KGC) while their public keys are determined
with their IDs. KGC can go off-line after the setup of common system parameters and
the distribution of keys to users. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she can
encrypt the message using the public key computed from the ID of Bob (name, e-mail
address, etc., as long as it can be used to uniquely identify the user). The encrypted
message can only be decrypted by Bob using his private key previously obtained from
the KGC. Currently the well known ID-based encryption scheme [15] that incorporates
the bilinear map and pairing is as follows:
ID-based cryptosystem proposed by Boneh and Franklin
• Setup. KGC generates two groups (G1 , +) as the additive group and (G2 , ·) as
the multiplicative group. Both with prime order q. It also generates a bilinear
map ê : (G1 , +) × (G1 , +) → (G2 , ·). It selects an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1 ,
then picks s ∈ Z∗q randomly and sets Ppub = sP as its public key, where s denotes
the master private key. Finally, two cryptographically strong hash functions are
selected:
– F : {0, 1}∗ → G1
– H : G2 → {0, 1}n
where n denotes the size of the plaintext space. The system parameters and their
descriptions are made public in a tuple {G1 , G2 , ê, q, n, P, Ppub , F, H} while the
master private key s is kept secret.
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• Extract. After performing physical identification of a user, say Alice, and making sure the uniqueness of her IDAlice , KGC generates Alice’s private key as
follows:
1. Computes QAlice = F (IDAlice ) and sets SAlice = sQAlice .
2. Gives SAlice to Alice as her private key.
In Bob’s case, his identity is IDBob and his private key is SBob = sQBob .
• Encrypt. To encrypt a message to Bob, Alice first obtains the system parameters
and uses Bob’s identity to compute QBob = F (IDBob ). Then she will perform the
following steps:
1. Prepares a message m ∈ {0, 1}n .
2. Picks r ∈ Zq∗ randomly and computes rP .
3. Sets k = ê(QBob , Ppub )r .
4. Sends Bob the ciphertext C = (rP, m ⊕ H(k)).
• Decrypt. Let C = (U, V ) be the ciphertext received by Bob. To decrypt C using
his private key SBob , he will perform the following steps:
1. Computes k = ê(SBob , U ) = ê(sQBob , rP ) = ê(QBob , sP )r = ê(QBob , PP ub )r .
2. The message is m = V ⊕ H(k)

4.2.2

Single encryption and multiple decryptions

In [53], a new public key based cryptosystem was proposed where there is one public
encryption key and multiple decryption keys. It works by considering the polynomial
function:
f (x) =

n
Y

(x − xi ) ≡

i=1

n
X

a i xi

i=0

where ai denotes the coefficient corresponding to xi after the expansion of f (x):
a0 =

n
Y

(−xi )

i=1

a1 =

n Y
n
X
i=1 j6=i

(−xj )
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..
.
n
X
=
(−xi )
i=1

an = 1
Note that f (xi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n is equal to 0. Under this construction, any generator
g ∈ Z∗q rises to the power of f (x), i.e. g f (x) mod q (q is a large prime) will give the
result equals to 1 for x = xi , i = 1 . . . n. (We assume the calculations in this chapter
are under modulo q and will omit the mod q notation in the rest of the chapter where
it is obvious from the context).
With this property, we let x1 , x2 , . . . , xn be the private decryption keys of user
U1 , U2 , . . . , Un respectively and {g0 , g1 , g2 , . . . , gn } = {g a0 , g a1 , g a2 , . . . , g an } be the public
encryption key tuple. Then a message m can be encrypted as m · g0r by choosing a
random number r ∈ Z∗q and sending C = {m · g0r , g1r , g2r , . . . , gnr } as the ciphertext. The
encrypted message can be decrypted by any one of the users by using his own private
key xi to calculate:
m·

g0r

·

n
Y

rxj
gj i

= m·

j=1

n
Y

j=0
Pn

= m·g

rxji

gj

j=0

aj xji ·r

= m · g f (xi )·r
= m · 1r
= m

4.3
4.3.1

Our Encryption/Decryption Scheme
System Model

We consider the situation where a group of users are selected as a subset from the user
set U = {U1 , U2 , . . . , Uk } who would like to form a wireless ad-hoc network by using
their wireless devices. There exists a KGC that sets up system parameters, generates
and distributes private keys as described before. The KGC will accept any person’s
ID. Upon successful verification of the ID, KGC generates the private key associated
with the ID provided. The n users in set U are those who have contacted the KGC to
obtain their private key and have their ID being known by each user within the set.
We note that the KGC’s role is only to provide the necessary system parameters and
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distribute each user his private key, hence the KGC is not necessary to keep online after
the completion of these procedures and is not required anymore by the users who want
to setup a wireless ad-hoc network, which fulfill the infrastructureless requirement of
wireless ad-hoc networks.

4.3.2

Cryptographic Requirements

We assume there exists an adversary A 6∈ U . All messages available in the network
are also available to A. This includes all the messages sent by any set of users ⊂ U
that wishes to create a wireless ad-hoc network. The main goal of A is to deviate the
protocol by decrypting any messages sent within the network intended to any set of
users ⊂ U but not him. A is considered to be successful if he wins in the following
experiment:
Indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen plaintext attack
(IND-CPA)
1. A picks a group of user IDs to be attacked and tells the challenger C.
2. C runs the KGC’s Setup algorithm to generate the necessary system parameters
and his private key. The parameters are given to A while C keeps his private key
secret.
3. A can query C up to qH hash queries on any ID he wants and up to qE extraction
queries on any ID not equal to the IDs he picked in phase 1. C will reply with
proper hash results on those IDs and runs the Extract algorithm to reply A the
private keys he needs.
4. Meanwhile, A will select two messages {m0 , m1 } and gives them to C. C will then
pick one of them randomly by flipping a fair coin to obtain b ∈ {0, 1}. C runs
the Encrypt algorithm on mb using the IDs picked by A in phase 1 to get the
ciphertext C and gives it back to A without letting him knows which message is
being picked.
5. A can keep on querying C the hash or extract values if the total numbers of
queries have not exceeded qH and qE .
0

6. Eventually A will make a guess b ∈ {0, 1} on which message was being picked
by C.
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0

If A somehow managed to guess the correct answer (i.e. b = b) in the experiment on
the protocol above then A wins the experiment and the protocol is not secure. We say
that A has a guessing advantage ε that the probability of A winning the experiment
0

is P [b = b] =

1
2

+ ε. A protocol is said to be secure against IND-CPA if there exist no

adversaries with advantage ε that can win the experiment within qH + qE queries, in
other words ε is negligible.

4.3.3

Key Agreement Properties

Our scheme is secure against IND-CPA, which means no adversaries can decrypt the
messages sent within the network not intended to them. If we consider the messages as
some group keys in different sessions, we obtain a secure group key agreement scheme
for the wireless ad-hoc network users with the following properties:
1. Group Key Secrecy - The group key is computationally infeasible to compute.
2. Known Session Key Secrecy - Even if one or more previous group session keys
are exposed, the current or future session keys are still secure.
3. Forward Secrecy - If one or more group members’ private key are exposed, only
the previous session keys are revealed, the current or future session keys are still
secure.
4. Key Control Secrecy - The group key is randomly constructed and can not be
predicted.

4.4

Implementation of Our Scheme

We incorporate the ID-based cryptosystem [63] and its construction using a bilinear map and pairing [15] together with the single encryption and multiple decryption
method [53] to create a secure and efficient encryption/decryption scheme for wireless
ad-hoc networks.
For simplicity, we assume that each of the users Ui ∈ U has contacted the KGC
to obtain their ID-based private key Si = sF (IDi ). {G1 , G2 , ê, q, n, P, Ppub , F, H}, the
system parameters, are publicly known and each user’s ID is known within the user
group U. These procedures can be done at anytime before the network is formed.
0

Let there be a set of users U and a subset U ⊂ U of size n who want to form
0

a wireless ad-hoc network group. Let Us denotes a group member who joins U and
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wants to broadcast a message (or session key) to the rest of the group. We refer to
0

U ∪ {Us } as the current group. Our scheme works as follows:
• Setup. Given the system parameters as described above, each of the group
members in the current group will perform the following calculations:
– Select a random number r ∈ Z∗q , set R = rP .
– For the other n group members in the current group, calculate
ei = H(ê(Ppub , rF (IDi ))), i = 1 . . . n.
– Use the ei values to construct the polynomial function
Q
P
f (e) = ni=1 (e − ei ) = ni=0 ai ei .
– Compute {g0 , g1 , . . . , gn } = {g a0 , g a1 , ..., g an }.
After this phase, each group member is equipped with a different encryption key
tuple {g0 , g1 , . . . , gn , R}. This tuple will not change throughout the whole session.
Provided that the group topology does not change and none of the private keys
of current group members has been exposed.
• Encrypt. Let m be the message (or new session key). Us will perform the
following calculations to encrypt m and broadcast it to the rest of current group
members:
– Select two random numbers k1 , k2 ∈ Z∗q .
– Raise each component in the encryption tuple to power k2 , i.e. calculate
{g0k2 , g1k2 , . . . , gnk2 }.
– Encrypt the message m as Z = m ⊕ k1 and compute A = k1 · g0k2 .
– Broadcast C = {Z, A, g1k2 , . . . , gnk2 , R}.
• Decrypt. Upon receiving the broadcast message from Us , each user in current
group can decrypt the message with the following calculations:
– Compute ei = H(ê(R, Si )) using his private key Si .
Q
k ·ej
– Compute k = A · nj=1 gj 2 i
– m = Z ⊕ k.
Note that from the computations above:
H(ê(R, Si )) = H(ê(rP, sF (IDi ))) = H(ê(sP, rF (IDi ))) = H(ê(Ppub , rF (IDi )))
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and
A·

n
Y

k ·ej
gj 2 i

= k1 ·

g0k2

·

j=1

n
Y

k ·eji

gj 2

j=1

= k1 ·

n
Y

k ·eji

gj 2

j=0
Pn

= k 1 · g k2 ·

j=0

aj eji

= k1 · g f (ei )·k2
= k1 · 1k2
= k1
hence k = k1 and message m can be decrypted correctly.
As the wireless ad-hoc user group is dynamic, whenever there is a join or leave of
group member, current group members can simply add or exclude that member’s ID
during execution of Setup to obtain a new encryption key tuple. Note that the pairing
computation for the ei values can be reused if the new join member is a returning old
member. Only the encryption key tuple is needed to recalculate. This can save a lot
of computation as pairing computations are expensive.

4.4.1

Security Analysis

To prove our scheme is secure against IND-CPA, we first assume that there exists an
adversary A that wins in the indistinguishability experiment described in section 4.3.2.
Then we create a simulator B that intercepts all the communication between A and
the challenger C. B is able to modify and forward the communication contents and
is transparent to A and C. A sees no difference between the simulator B or the real
challenger C. The goal of B is to make use of A to solve a cryptographic hard problem.
Since the hard problem is known to be unsolvable in polynomial time, the assumption
that A exists leads to a contradiction and hence our scheme is secure. We first review
the cryptographic hard problem that we will use in the proof:
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem(BDH)
It was introduced in [15]:
Given an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, θ) where P is a generator ∈ G1 , a, b, c ∈ Z∗q are
chosen uniformly at random and θ ∈ G2 . The goal for an attacker is to decide
whether θ = ê(P, P )abc within polynomial time.

4.4. Implementation of Our Scheme

34

BDH is hard with an assumption that there does not exist a polynomial time
algorithm for any attacker to solve BDH, such that the probability of success is nonnegligible.
We now construct the simulator B as follows (note that C can be omitted here as
B has simulated it):
1. B is given an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, θ) of BDH as described above.
2. A picks a group of user IDs to be attacked and tells B.
3. B runs the KGC’s Setup algorithm to generate the necessary system parameters.
The parameters {G1 , G2 , ê, q, n, P, Ppub , F, H} are modified by B by setting Ppub
to cP before giving to A.
4. Whenever A issues a hash query on IDi , B replies with his modified hash function
0

F using the following method:
0

• B maintains a query list Flist : {IDi , ri , F (IDi )}. When the query on IDi
has been asked before, B looks up Flist to find the matching IDi and replies
0

with F (IDi ).
• If the query on IDi has not been asked before, B first selects a random
number ri ∈ Z∗q and further checks that if IDi is one of the IDs picked by A
0

0

in phase 2. If it is, B sets F (IDi ) = ri P + bP , else B sets F (IDi ) = ri P .
0

• B updates Flist with the new entry and replies A F (IDi ).
5. Whenever A issues an extraction query on IDi , B replies with his modified
Extract algorithm using the following method:
0

• If the query on IDi exists on Flist , B takes the F (IDi ) value and replies
with Si = ri cP .
• Otherwise B follows the hash query replying method to create a new entry
for IDi first then replies with Si = ri cP .
• Note that A is not allowed to query on the IDs picked in phase 2 for ex0

traction values, hence F (IDi ) is always in the form ri P in Flist and ri cP =
0

cri P = cF (IDi ), which is a perfect simulation of extraction value(since Ppub
has been replaced by cP ).
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6. At the time A provides two messages {m0 , m1 }, B picks one of them randomly
to obtain b ∈ {0, 1} and looks up Flist for the ri values on the IDs picked by A in
phase 2. B runs the Setup algorithm of our protocol to calculate the ei values for
these IDs by setting R = aP and ei = H(θ · ê(R, Ppub )ri ). With these ei values,
B runs the Encrypt algorithm of our scheme to encrypt the selected message mb
and sends A the ciphertext.
7. A can keep on querying if the total numbers of queries have not exceeded qH and
qE .
0

8. Eventually A will make a guess b ∈ {0, 1} on which message was being picked
by B.
0

If the guess from A is correct (i.e. b = b), then B knows that θ = ê(P, P )abc , otherwise
B knows that θ 6= ê(P, P )abc . This is because the ei values computed by B can construct
a valid ciphertext on mb .
Note that if A guesses it correctly, then
ei = H(θ · ê(R, Ppub )ri )
= H(ê(P, P )abc · ê(aP, cP )ri )
= H(ê(aP, bcP + ri cP ))
0

= H(ê(R, cF (IDi )))
= H(ê(R, Si ))
From the construction of simulator B above, we successfully show that B can solve
the BDH using the guess provided by A, which contradicts the statement that BDH
is unsolvable. Hence the assumption that A exists is invalid and our scheme is secure.
The key agreement properties mentioned in section 4.3.3 are straight froward: Our
IND-CPA protocol implies the Group Key Secrecy. With two random values k1 , k2
selected every time the new session key is broadcasted, we ensure the Known Session
Key Secrecy and Key Control Secrecy. Forward Secrecy can be provided if the group
member who has lost his private key is promptly informed to the group and the other
group members can simply exclude his ID from the Setup phase.

4.5. Conclusion
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Conclusion

We created a new encryption/decryption scheme for wireless ad-hoc networks. The
scheme offers an efficient setup algorithm, together with an efficient method for encrypting and decrypting the message among the wireless ad-hoc network group. Member joining or removal is also simple and quick. With only one broadcast message, each
member in the wireless ad-hoc network group can obtain a new group session key. The
use of ID-based cryptosystem provides an easy way to setup our scheme and to include
or exclude designated receivers without interrupting the other group members, which
can be an advantage for greater flexibility.

Chapter 5
Universal Designated Multi Verifier
Signature Schemes
5.1
5.1.1

Introduction
Motivation

The encryption/decryption scheme in the previous chapter provides a good protection
for the communication content within the wireless ad-hoc networks. But this does not
guarantee that the group members participating in the network are authorized to join
or to use the resources within the network. Consider a situation that a conference
meeting is opened for the employees with special duty in a company and they will
use their mobile devices to form a wireless ad-hoc network. What determines which
employee can join the network, along with the encryption/decryption scheme, will
complete the task on securing the network. A digitally signed document (from now on
we simply call it a certificate or cert. in short) issued by the manager of department
will serve this purpose.
A general digital signature may help to prove that the cert. holder is allowed to
join the network, but there are a few more requirements when applying on wireless
ad-hoc networks.
1. The cert. verification process has to be efficient.
2. The size of cert. has to be small.
3. Only those who are appointed are able to verify the cert..
4. The appointed verifiers can be adaptively chosen
Since the cert. is used to determine if someone is allowed to join the network or not. It
can not be sent out to let everyone verify or else there is a possibility that it is captured
37
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by a malicious user and provided him a ticket to join the network. This violates the
availability requirement. A general digital signature allows anyone who possesses the
cert. to verify the document content, which fails requirement 3.

5.1.2

Related Work

A special digital signature called undeniable signature first proposed by Chaum and
van Antwerpen in 1989 [23] serves a similar purpose here. In their notion, the cert. is
only verifiable with the signer’s consent by an interactive proof. In short, undeniable
signatures are not universally verifiable. However, it was known that this type of
signature scheme has some drawbacks as discussed in [26, 27] due to blackmailing
and mafia attacks. To overcome this problem, another special digital signature called
designated verifier signature was proposed in [37], by changing the proof into a noninteractive proof. This scheme is known to be the first non-interactive version of [22]
but recently a possible attack on it was found in [76]. Designated verifier signatures
restricted that only a designated person can verify the cert.. Whenever a designated
verifier signature is presented to a chosen verifier, by using his own private key in the
verification process, he can only come up with two conclusions: Either the document
is signed by the signer or the signer knows his private key (as same as the document
is signed by himself). Since the verifier knows that he neither signed the document
nor letting the signer knows his private key, he is convinced with the validity of the
cert.. If later on the verifier releases the signature to a third party, this third party
can not tell whether the signer signed the document or the verifier did, so he will not
be convinced even if the verifier agrees to reveal his own private key. Similar work like
Araki et al.’s limited verifier signature in [3] was later found to be vulnerable in [80].
Recently a construction of designated verifier signature scheme using bilinear map was
proposed in [44].
Although designated verifier signature fulfill requirement 3 by designating the current group members to be the verifiers. The verification process is not efficient. As
there are n group members, we need to create n different designated verifier signatures
for these n members. In [25], Desmedt raised the question ”Can the designated verifier
signature be generalized into a Multi Designated Verifier Signature?”, which allows the
n members to carry out the verification process from a single designated verifier signature. This question has been answered affirmatively in [43]. Using their construction,
requirement 1 is also fulfilled, however, their signature size is not small. Another reason
that this scheme can not be directly applied in wireless ad-hoc networks is because the
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verifiers for the cert. are fixed at the time the cert. is generated. As a result, when
there are new members join into the current group, they are not able to verify the cert.
until the manager signed another cert. that included them as one of the verifiers, hence
fails requirement 4.
In [60], the notion of ring signatures was formalized and an efficient scheme based
on RSA was proposed. A ring signature scheme allows a signer who knows at least
one secret information (or trapdoor information) to produce a sequence of n random
permutation and form them into a ring. This signature can be used to convince any
third party that one of the people in the group (who knows the trapdoor information)
has authenticated the message on behalf of the group. The authentication provides
signer ambiguity, in the sense that no one can identify who has actually signed the
message. In [1], a method to construct a ring signature from different types of public
keys, such as those for integer factoring based schemes and discrete log based schemes,
was proposed. The proposed scheme is more efficient than [60]. The formal security
definition of a ring signature is also given in [1].
The designated verifier proofs proposed in [37] allow signatures to convince only
the intended recipient, who is assumed to have a public-key. As noted in [60], ring
signature schemes can be used to provide this mechanism by joining the verifier in the
ring. However, it might not be practical in the real life since the verifier might not
have any public key setup.
Motivated by the above issue, Steinfeld et al. proposed the notion of universal
designated verifier signature in [69]. In their notion, a cert. is given to a cert. holder
(the employee who is allowed to join the network) and is capable to choose anyone as
the cert. verifier and designated the cert. to him. This scheme was constructed using
bilinear map and a variation using standard RSA/Schnorr signature was proposed in
[70]. Although both of them fulfill requirement 4, they are not multi designated verifier
signature and n universal designated verifier signatures are still needed for the n group
members to verify the cert., hence not cost effective enough.
Now we take a look at an example scenario of UDVS schemes:
A user Alice is issued a cert. by the CA. When Alice wishes to present her cert. to
a verifier Bob, she uses Bob’s public key to transform the signature on the cert.
into a designated signature for Bob by using the UDVS scheme’s designation
algorithm. Then she sends the transformed signature to Bob.
Bob can use the CA’s public key together with his private key to verify the designated signature on the cert., but is unable to use this designated signature to convince
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any other third party that the cert. was indeed signed by the CA, even if Bob is willing
to reveal his secret-key to the third party. This is achieved because Bob’s secret-key
allows him to forge designated signatures by himself, so the third party is unable to
tell who produced the signature (whereas Bob can, because he knows that he did not
produce it). Therefore, through the use of a UDVS scheme, Alice’s privacy is preserved
in the sense that Bob is unable to disseminate convincing statements about Alice (of
course, nothing prevents Bob from revealing the cert. statements themselves to any
third party, but the third party will be unable to tell whether these statements are
authentic, i.e. whether they have been signed by the CA or not).

5.1.3

Contributions of This Chapter

The contributions of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, we extend the notion of UDVS
schemes to Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signature (UDMVS) schemes. In the
new notion, a signature holder can designate the signature to a group of designated
verifiers. We show an efficient construction of UDMVS schemes based on bilinear
pairing. Secondly, we show an extension of our scheme to construct a designated multi
verifier signature scheme. We note that our scheme satisfies the definition of designated
multi verifier signature schemes defined in [44], but our scheme does not depend on the
ring signature scheme, and hence, our scheme is more efficient.

5.2

Our Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signatures Scheme

5.2.1

System Model

The definition of a Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signature (UDMVS) scheme is
very similar to a UDVS scheme. A UDMVS is a tuple of seven algorithms (that may
be randomized) as follows:
1. Common Parameter Generation (Setup): is an algorithm that accepts a security parameter k and outputs a string consisting of common scheme parameters
that are publicly shared by all users, cp.
2. Signer Key Generation (SKeygen): is an algorithm that accepts a common
scheme parameter cp and outputs a secret/public key pair (skS , pkS ).
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3. Verifiers Key Generation (VKeygen): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme parameter cp and a number n as the number of verifiers, outputs n
secret/public key pairs (ski , pki ), i = 1, · · · , n, for n verifiers.
4. Signature Generation (Sign): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme
parameter cp, a signer’s private key skS and a message m, outputs signer’s publicly verifiable signature σ.
5. Public Verification (Verify): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme
parameter cp, a signer’s public key pkS , a message m and a signature σ, outputs
True if the verification is correct or ⊥ otherwise.
6. Designation (Designate): is an algorithm that accepts a common scheme parameter cp, a signer’s public key pkS , verifiers’ public key pk1 , · · · , pkn and a
message/signature pair (m, σ), outputs a designated multi verifier signature σ̂.
7. Designated Verification (DVerify): is an algorithm that accepts a common
scheme parameter cp, a signer’s public key pkS , verifiers’ private key ski , i =
1, · · · , n and a message/designated multi verifier signature pair (m, σ̂), outputs
True if the verification is correct or ⊥ otherwise.

5.2.2

Cryptographic Requirements

Completeness
We require UDMVS scheme to satisfy the following probability equation:
P r[DVerify(pkS , sk1 , · · · , skn , Designate(pkS , pk1 , · · · , pkn , (m, σ))] = 1
where
cp ← Setup(k)
(skS , pkS ) ← SKeygen(cp)
(ski , pki ) ← VKeygen(cp, n)
σ ← Sign(cp, skS , m)
True ← Verify(cp, pkS , m, σ)

5.2. Our Universal Designated Multi Verifier Signatures Scheme

42

Non-Transferability
We require a UDMVS scheme to be non-transferable. The non-transferability property
is ensured by a transcript simulation algorithm that can be performed by all designated verifiers to produce an indistinguishable signature from the one that should be
produced by the signature holder.
Unforgeability
We provide a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a UDMVS scheme under
a chosen message attack (UF-CMA). It is defined using the following game between an
adversary A and a challenger C:
• Let A be the UF-CMA adversary. In the startup of the game, C provides the
common scheme parameter, cp, to A, where cp ← Setup(k) and k is the security
parameter.
• C provides the signer’s public key pkS and verifiers’ public key pk1 , · · · , pkn to A.
• At any time, A can query the hash oracle for the hash result on any message mi
of his choice up to qH times (which is polynomial in k). C will answer A’s queries
by providing the hash value H(mi ).
• At any time, A can query the signing oracle for the signature on any message mi
of his choice specifying any user he likes up to qS times (which is polynomial in
k). C will answer A’s queries by providing the value σ = Sign(cp, skS , mi ) where
skS is the corresponding private key of the specified user queried by A for mi .
• C will not answer any Verify request because A can verify the signature by
himself.
• Eventually, A will output a valid UDMVS for a message m∗ that has never been
queried to the signing oracle before, for the designated verifiers with public keys
pk1 , · · · , pkn .
U F −U DM V S−CM A
(k)
The success probability of an adversary is defined by SuccA

We say that a UDMVS scheme is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message
attack if the probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary in the above
game is negligible. In other words,
SuccUAF −U DM V S−CM A (k) ≤ ²
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Implementation of Our Scheme

5.3.1

A Trivial Scheme

We start our concrete UDMVS scheme by modifying the UDVS scheme proposed in
[69]. We note that this scheme can be trivially modified to achieve a UDMVS scheme
as follows:
• Setup: Select a bilinear group-pair (G1 , GM ) of prime order q, where q = |G1 | =
|GM | with description string DG specifying a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM and
a generator P ∈ G1 , together with a cryptographic hash function H0 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1 . The common scheme parameter is cp = (DG , P, H0 ).
R

• SKeygen: Given cp, pick a random skS ∈ Z∗q and compute pkS = skS P . Let
Ppub = pkS , the signer’s public key is (cp, Ppub ) and the private key is (cp, skS ).
• VKeygen: Given cp and n as the number of the verifiers, pick a different random
R

ski ∈ Z∗q , i = 1, · · · , n for each verifier and compute pki = ski P . The public key
for verifier i is (cp, pki ) and the private key is (cp, ski ).
• Sign: Given the signer’s private key (cp, skS ), and a message m, compute σ =
skS H0 (m) as the signature on m.
• Verify: Given the signer’s public key (cp, Ppub ) and a message/signature pair
?

(m, σ), accept the signature iff ê(P, σ) = ê(Ppub , H0 (m)) holds with equality.
Otherwise, return ⊥.
• Designate: Given a set of verifiers’ public key (cp, pk1 , · · · , pkn ) and a message/signature pair (m, σ), compute σ̂i = ê(pki , σ), for all i = 1, · · · , n.
• DVerify: Given a signer’s public key (cp, pkS ), a set of verifiers’ secret/public
key (cp, (sk1 , pk1 ), · · · , (skn , pkn )) and a set of message/designated verifier signa?

tures (m, σˆ1 , · · ·, σˆn ), accept iff σ̂i = ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski , i = 1, · · · , n, holds with
equality. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Correctness
The correctness of the trivial UDMVS scheme is justified as follows:
?

σ̂i = ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski
= ê(skS P, H0 (m))ski
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= ê(P, skS H0 (m))ski
= ê(ski P, σ)
= ê(pki , σ)
Non-Transferability
The non-transferability is achieved because each verifier can simulate the signature σ̂i
by producing an indistinguishable signature σ́i from the one that was designated by a
signature holder as follows:
σ́i = ê(Ppub , H0 (m))ski = σ̂i
We note that since Ppub is publicly available, any verifier can produce such a signature using his own private key (cp, ski ).
Efficiency
The signature produced by the Designate algorithm is of the form (σˆ1 , · · · , σˆn ), which
results in an n|G1 | bits signature. In the next section, we will show an efficient construction of UDMVS scheme that only requires |G1 | bit length. Since this signature is
trivial, we omit the formal definition of existential unforgeability for this scheme.

5.3.2

An Efficient UDMVS Scheme

In this section, we present an efficient UDMVS scheme from bilinear pairing. The
construction is as follows:
• Setup: The same as our trivial scheme.
• SKeygen: The same as our trivial scheme.
• VKeygen: The same as our trivial scheme.
• Sign: The same as our trivial scheme.
• Verify: The same as our trivial scheme.
• Designate: Given a set of verifiers’ public key (cp, pk1 , · · · , pkn ) and a message/signature pair (m, σ), compute
σ̂ = ê(σ,

n
X
i=1

pki )
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• DVerify: Given a signer’s public key (cp, Ppub ), a set of verifiers’ secret/public key
(cp, (sk1 , pk1 ), · · · , (skn , pkn )) and a message/designated multi verifier signature
pair (m, σ̂), each verifier performs the following algorithm:
– Sign the message m as σei = ski H0 (m) and publish it among the n verifiers.
– Validate all the σj received by running Verify(cp, pkj , m, σej ), j = 1, · · · , n.
Fail if ⊥ is returned in any one of the signatures.
– Test whether
?

σ̂ =

n
Y

ê(σei , Ppub )

i=1

holds with equality. Return true if it holds, or ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness
The correctness of the DVerify algorithm is justified as follows:
?

σ̂ =

n
Y

ê(σei , Ppub )

i=1

=
=
=

n
Y
i=1
n
Y
i=1
n
Y

ê(ski H0 (m), skS P )
ê(skS H0 (m), ski P )
ê(σ, ski P )

i=1

= ê(σ,
= ê(σ,

n
X
i=1
n
X

ski P )
pki )

i=1

Non-Transferability
The non-transferability property is due to the following. Let n verifiers collude to
generate a signature on a message m. Each of them will perform the following:
• Sign the message as σi = ski H0 (m) and send it to the other verifiers.
• Check if all of the σj , j = 1, · · · , n received are valid, if no, then fail.
• Compute σ́ =

Qn
i=1

ê(σi , Ppub )
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Note that σ́ is indistinguishable from the signature σ̂ that should have been generated by a signature holder. Hence, no other third party will be convinced with the
authenticity of the signature. However, a user in the verifiers group will be convinced
because if he/she has not colluded, then he/she is ensured that the signature is authentic.
Unforgeability
Let A be an UF-CMA adversary in the unforgeability game. We will build a simulator
B that will use A to solve an instance of the BDH problem. The purpose of the
algorithm B is to compute ê(P, P )abc from (P, aP, bP, cP ) for unknown a, b, c, which is
given in the beginning of the game. The simulation is as follows:
• B provides A the common scheme parameter cp and sends aP as the public key
Ppub of the signer to A.
R

• B generates some random numbers ui ∈ Z∗q and computes ui cP as the public keys
pki , i = 1, · · · , n of the verifiers and gives them to A.
• Every time when A issues a hash query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qH of his
choice, B will answer the query as follows:
– B maintains a hash record [m, H(m), r, f ] to store all the hash results, it
grows as new hash result has replied.
– If the query on mi has not been asked before (and hence, it does not exist
R

in the record maintained by B), then B picks a random number ri ∈ Z∗q and
flips a {0, 1} coin that has probability α on outcome 0 and 1 − α on outcome
1. If 0 is obtained, B answers with H(mi ) = ri P . Otherwise, B answers
with H(mi ) = bP +ri P . B updates his record with (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ), where
fi ∈ {0, 1} is the result of the coin flipping.
– If the query on mi has been asked before, then B looks up his record to obtain
the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) and answers with the stored value H(mi ).
• Every time when A issues a sign query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qS and any
public key pkj , j = 1, · · · , n of his choice, B will answer the query as follows:
– If the query on (mi , pkj ) has not been asked before (and hence, it does not
R

exist in the record maintained by B), then B picks a random number ri ∈ Z∗q
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and answers the query with ri pkj . B updates his record with (mi , ri P, ri , 0).
Note that ri pkj = ri skj P = skj ri P = skj H(mi ), which is equal to the
signature on mi signed with the private key corresponds to pkj .
– If the query on (mi , pkj ) has been asked before, then B looks up on his
record to find the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ). If fi is found to be equal to
1 (i.e. H(mi ) = bP + ri P ), then B terminates and fails the simulation.
Otherwise if fi is found to be equal to 0 (i.e. H(mi ) = ri P ), then B return
ri P as the answer.
• Eventually, A will output a forged UDMVS pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) designated to all the
verifiers on a message m∗ that seems to have been signed by the signer. B needs
to look up on his record to find the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) where mi = m∗ . If
m∗ has not been queried (i.e. the entry is not found), then B terminates the
game with failure. But since the random values ri are randomly picked over
Z∗q , thanks to its uniform randomness, the hash results are distributed over G1
and the probability that A hits the hash result H(m∗ ) is

1
q

where q is a large

∗

prime, which is negligible. Hence m must have been queried during the hash
queries (i.e. A has obtained H(m∗ ) from B) and B is able to find the entry
(m∗ , H(m∗ ), ri∗ , fi∗ ) where i∗ denotes the index where mi∗ = m∗ . In order to
compute the answer for the given instance to the BDH problem, H(m∗ ) has to
be in the form of bP + ri∗ P (i.e. fi∗ = 1). If it is not, B terminates and fails the
simulation. Otherwise, B calculates and outputs σ ∗(

Pn

i=1

ui )−1

· ê(aP, cP )−ri∗ .

If B does not terminate in the simulation, the answer computed by B is equal to :
Pn

σ ∗(

i=1

ui )−1

· ê(aP, cP )−ri∗ = ê(σ,

Pn

Pn

−1

( i=1 ui )
· ê(aP, cP )−ri∗
i=1 pki )
Pn
P
−1
= ê(aH(m∗ ), ni=1 ui cP )( i=1 ui ) · ê(aP, cP )−ri∗
Pn

= ê(a(bP + ri∗ P ), cP )(

i=1

ui )(

Pn

i=1

ui )−1

· ê(aP, cP )−ri∗

= ê(abP + ari∗ P, cP ) · ê(−ri∗ aP, cP )
= ê(abP, cP ) · ê(ari∗ P, cP ) · ê(−ari∗ P, cP )
= ê(P, P )abc
Hence B has successfully solved the BDH problem for the given instance (P, aP, bP, cP ).
Note that the probability that B successes is:
U F −U DM V S−CM A
(k)
P r[fi = 0, i = 1, · · · , qS ] × P r[fi∗ = 1] × SuccA

= αqS (1 − α)SuccUAF −U DM V S−CM A (k)
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In order to have a maximum probability of success, we take derivative on this value
U F −U DM V S−CM A
and found it is maximize at α = qS (qS +1)−1 . Let β = SuccA
(k). Hence

B solves the BDH problem with probability:
(qS (qS + 1)−1 )qS (1 − qS (qS + 1)−1 )β
qS qS
β
= (
) (
)
qS + 1
qS + 1
1
β
= (1 + )−qS (
)
qS
qS + 1
β
≥
e(qS + 1)
where e is the base for natural logarithm. In other words, B solved the BDH problem
with non-negligible probability, which contradicts with the BDH assumption. Therefore, we complete the proof.
Efficiency
The signature produced by our UDMVS scheme is |G1 | bit length as we have required,
which is very efficient.

5.4

Designated Multi Verifier Signature Scheme

Designated multi verifier signature schemes have been formally defined in [43]. Their
construction uses ring signature schemes which make the signature scheme inefficient.
In this section, we modify our UDMVS scheme to generate a designated verifier signature scheme. In contrast to the construction in [43], our scheme only requires |G1 | bits
in terms of the signature length. The scheme is as follows:
• Setup: The same as our trivial scheme.
• SKeygen: The same as our trivial scheme.
• VKeygen: The same as our trivial scheme.
• Sign: Execute the Sign algorithm in our trivial scheme plus the Designate
algorithm in our efficient UDMVS scheme.
• Verify: The same as the DVerify algorithm in our efficient UDMVS scheme.
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Note that the signature generated by the Sign algorithm can also be constructed by
a collusion of n verifiers (refer to the proof of non-transferability of our efficient UDMVS
scheme). Therefore, no other third party can be convinced with the authenticity of the
signature other than the verifiers in the designated verifiers set. Hence, this scheme
also fulfills our requirements of signature schemes for wireless ad-hoc networks and
provides another option for the network users to choose from.

5.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we firstly proposed the notion of Universal Designated Multi Verifier
Signature (UDMVS) schemes. We formalized this notion by proposing their model and
cryptographic requirements. We proceeded with an efficient construction of UDMVS
scheme based on bilinear pairing that only requires |G1 | bit length signature. Finally,
we also pointed out that our UDMVS scheme can be easily transformed to achieve a
designated multi verifier scheme, which turns out to be more efficient than the construction proposed in [43]. Wireless ad-hoc network users can use the UDMVS scheme
to generate tickets for potential network group members. This provides them a method
to authenticate the origins of each other.

Chapter 6
Limited Credential Systems
6.1
6.1.1

Introduction
Motivation

Up to now we have created an encryption/decryption scheme and a signature scheme
for wireless ad-hoc network users. These schemes are enough to provide a secure
communication environment in most of the cases. In this chapter, we further extend
our UDMVS scheme to handle some special but also critical scenarios that may happen
in a wireless ad-hoc environment. We introduce our limited credential systems.
Limited credential systems allow an authority to provide a credential to a user.
A group of people has been predetermined by the authority during the credential
generation process. The user can use the credential to convince this group of people.
For example Alice can obtain a limited credential (a statement of a designated type
that attests to one or more of the user’s attributes) from an authority Charlie and
then shows it to another user Bob. Thus Bob will be convinced that Alice has the
credential authorized by Charlie. Additionally, Bob cannot convince anyone else that
Alice indeed has the authorized credential. On the whole Alice can only convince a
person of her credential iff this person belongs to a group specified by Charlie.
Consider a situation where limited credential system is applicable. The president
has sent a special task force to country X during the war. A secret agent is needed to
help the task force to win the war. The president has issued a credential to the secret
agent. Thus she can convince any member of the task force in country X to believe that
she has obtained an instruction (and hence, a credential) from the president. However
to protect the agent’s identity we must ensure that none of the members of the task
force can convince anyone else that the agent is indeed a secret agent that has been
sent by the president. In addition we also want to protect the president. Consider a
scenario where the secret agent betrays her president and she would like to show to
50
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a third party that she has indeed received an order from the president. This third
party is not a member of the task force. We should protect the president so that the
secret agent cannot convince anyone who is not a member of the task force. Another
final requirement is the security of the agent herself. We would also like to protect the
agent so that if the president sends a “wrong” instruction or credential to her, then this
action can be stopped. To illustrate the last scenario, consider a situation where the
president wants to “sacrifice” this agent. In this case, the president will give a wrong
credential to her. When she arrives country X the task force will definitely perform
its task and kill the agent.

6.1.2

Related Work

The notion to allow two parties to secretly identify each other has been studied in the
literature [46, 33, 18, 8, 21]. An Oblivious Signature Based Envelope (OSBE) scheme
[46] enables the sender to send a message with the assurance that can only be seen by
the receiver iff the receiver has appropriate certificates. At the same time this should
protect the receiver’s privacy such that the sender does not know whether the receiver
has the required certificates or not. OSBE performs access control on a message in
an oblivious way. In OSBE, the policy required is that the receiver holds appropriate
certificates.
One related notion to OSBE is Fair Exchange of Signatures (FES) [5]. FES protocols are useful in contract signing. There are several distinct differences between OSBE
and FES. The signatures involved in OSBE are not generated by the two parties involved in the protocols, but rather they are generated by certification author.
To protect a sensitive policy, Hidden Credential systems were introduced [33]. In
Hidden Credential systems, when the sender encrypts a message using a public key, he
does not need to specify which public key that has been used. The receiver must then
attempt decryption using each of her credentials. Although this can be computationally
inefficient, it ensures that if she does not have the correct credentials, then she learns
almost nothing about the policy controlling access to the message [33, 18].
Secret Handshakes [8] aim to allow members of the group to identify each other.
Secret Handshakes ensure that non-members cannot recognize the handshake and hence
are not able to recognize group members. Besides, non-members cannot perform the
handshake and so they are unable to trifle group members to think that they are also
members. This notion has been extended to k-Anonymous Secret Handshakes in [78].
A construction of Secret Handshakes without incorporated pairing based cryptosystem
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has been considered in [21].

6.1.3

Contributions of This Chapter

To sum it up a limited credential scheme has the following properties:
• The authority can issue a valid limited credential to a person, A, together with
a set of receivers, R, whom the person can convince about her credential.
• The credential holder, A, can verify the authenticity of the credential that she
has received from the authority.
• The credential holder, A, can only convince another person, B, about her credential, iff B is in the group R (limited designation property of limited credential
system).
• Receiving a convincing statement from the credential holder, A, any party in R
will believe with the authenticity of the credential, but any party in R cannot
convince any other third party about this fact (designated property of limited
credential system).
The model of limited credential schemes involves three parties, namely a credential
issuer, a credential holder and the designated verifier. Our scheme is an adaptation of
the Universal Designated Verifier Signature (UDVS) scheme proposed in [69]. However,
the UDVS scheme proposed in [69] allows the signature holder (or the credential holder)
to convince any receivers of her choice. Thus it is not suitable for our model. In addition
to presenting the scheme, we offer a formal notion of secure limited credential and prove
that our construction satisfies the formal definition of security. Both the definition of
limited credential systems and the analysis that our scheme satisfies to it are novel
which constitute the core of our contributions.

6.2
6.2.1

Our Limited Credential System
System Model

In this section, we provide a definition on a generic model for limited credential systems.
The model consists of a credential issuer US , a credential holder UH and n designated
verifiers UV1 , · · · , UVn .
A generic Limited Credential scheme consists of the following algorithms:
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• Common Parameter Generation(Setup): By inputting a security parameter
k, it outputs the description cp of common parameters, which is publicly shared
and required by all the users who participate in the scheme.
• Issuer Key Generation (IKeyGen): By inputting the description cp of common
parameters, it outputs a secret/public key pair (skS , pkS ) for the credential issuer
US .
• Credential Holder Key Generation (HKeyGen): By inputting the description
cp of common parameters, it outputs a secret/public key pair (skH , pkH ) for the
credential holder UH .
• Verifiers Key Generation (VKeyGen): By inputting the description cp of common parameters and a number n that describes the number of key pairs to generate, it outputs n secret/public key pairs (ski , pki ), i = 1, · · · , n, for n verifiers
UV1 , · · · , UVn .
• Limited Credential Generation (LCGen): By inputting the description cp
of common parameters, the credential issuer’s private key skS , the public keys
pk1 , · · · , pkn of designated verifiers, the public key pkH of the credential holder
UH and a message m, it outputs a limited credential (σ, L) on m for UH where
L is a list of possible designated verifiers for this limited credential. Note that
(σ, L) is only verifiable by the credential holder UH who holds the private key
skH .
• Credential Verification (LCVerify): By inputting the description cp of common parameters, the credential issuer’s public key pkS , the credential holder’s
private key skH , the public keys of designated verifiers pk1 , · · · , pkn , a message m
and a limited credential (σ, L), it outputs True if (σ, L) is correct or ⊥ otherwise.
• Credential Designation (LCDesignate): By inputting the description cp of
common parameters, the credential issuer’s public key pkS , a message m, a limited
credential (σ, L), a number i that indicates which designated verifier UVi on the
list L is to be designated and the public key pki of this designated verifier, it
outputs a designated credential σ̂ on m for UVi . Note that σ̂ is only verifiable by
the designated verifier UVi who holds the private key ski .
• Designated Credential Verification (DLCVerify): By inputting the description cp of common parameters, the credential issuer’s public key pkS , the private
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key skVi of the designated verifier UVi , a message m and a designated credential
σ̂, it outputs True if σ̂ is correct or ⊥ otherwise.

6.2.2

Cryptographic Requirements

We require a limited credential system to satisfy the following cryptographic requirements:
Completeness
Completeness properties for limited credential systems are defined as follows:
P r[T rue ← LCV erif y(cp, pkS , skH , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m, (σ, L))] = 1
where
cp ← Setup(k)
(skS , pkS ) ← IKeyGen(cp)
(skH , pkH ) ← HKeyGen(cp)
(skj , pkj ) ← V KeyGen(cp, n), f or j = 1, · · · , n
(σ, L) ← LCGen(cp, skS , pkH , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m)
and
P r[T rue ← DLCV erif y(cp, pkS , ski , m, σ̂)] = 1
where
cp ← Setup(k)
(skS , pkS ) ← IKeyGen(cp)
(skH , pkH ) ← HKeyGen(cp)
(skj , pkj ) ← V KeyGen(cp, n), f or j = 1, · · · , n
(σ, L) ← LCGen(cp, skS , pkH , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m)
T rue ← LCV erif y(cp, pkS , skH , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m, (σ, L))
σ̂ ← LCDesignate(pkS , pki , m, (σ, L), i), i : UVi ∈ L
Non-Transferability
Receiving a designated credential σ̂, where σ̂ = LCDesignate(pkS , pki , m, (σ, L), i), i :
UVi ∈ L. Only the verifier UVi ∈ L can verify and be convinced by the authenticity of σ̂.
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UVi cannot transfer or proof the result to any other third party. The non-transferability
property is ensured by a transcript simulation algorithm.
Unforgeability
The unforgeability of limited credential systems is defined by a game (experiment)
between an adversary A and a challenger C. The existential unforgeability of a limited
credential system under a chosen message attack (UF-CMA) is defined by the following
experiment:
1. Given a limited credential scheme, let A be the UF-CMA adversary. He takes cp
given by C that generated from Setup(k) where k is the security parameter. C
also provides A the public keys pkS , pkH , pk1 , · · · , pkn of the credential issuer US ,
the credential holder UH and the designated verifiers U1 , · · · , Un .
2. At any time, A can query for the hash result on any message mi of his choice up
to qH times (which is polynomial in k). C will answer A’s queries by providing
the hash value H(mi ).
3. At any time, A can query for the public/private key pair on any user Ui of his
choice up to qK times (which is polynomial in k). C will answer A’s queries by
providing the value (ski , pki ) ← VKeyGen(cp, 1).
4. At any time, A can query for requesting a credential (on any message mi of his
choice) specifying any users USi /UHi /UVi1 , · · · , UVin as the credential issuer/credential
holder/designated verifiers he likes up to qC times (which is polynomial in k). C
will answer A’s queries by providing the value (σ, L) ← LCGen(cp, skSi , pkHi ,
pki1 , · · · , pkin , mi ). If A has previously queried for the key pairs of these users,
then A can verify the credential himself, otherwise C will provide A the result
from LCVerify and/or DLCVerify.
5. Eventually, A will output a valid credential on a message m∗ with US as the
credential issuer, UH as the credential holder and UV1 , · · · , UVn as the designated
verifiers such that m∗ has never been queried for the credential result or m∗ has
been queried but not on these users.
The success probability of A to win the experiment (i.e. to break UF-CMA of
U F −LCS−CM A
limited credential scheme) is defined to be SuccA
(k). A limited credential
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scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack if the probability of success of any polynomially bounded adversary A in the above experiment
is negligible. In other words,
SuccUAF −LCS−CM A (k) ≤ ²
Limitability
Limitability property for limited credential systems is defined as follows. For any valid
(σ, L) that is hold by a credential holder UH , he can only designate the credential σ to
any verifier that is listed in L, specified by the credential issuer. In other words, there
exists no computational algorithms for any (σ, L) that will allow the credential holder
to designate σ to a user UO 6∈ L, such that T rue ← DLCV erif y(cp, pkS , skO , m, σ̂)
where (σ, L) ← LCGen(cp, skS , pkH , pk1 , · · · , pkn , m), and pkO 6∈ {pk1 , · · · , pkn }. The
limited designation property is defined by the following LD-CMA experiment, which
is slightly modified from the UF-CMA experiment defined earlier:
1-4. Same as the UF-CMA experiment.
5. At some stage, A will nominate a verifier UO within the verifiers given by C in
phase 1 that he would like to corrupt and ask for the limited credential (σ, L) on
any message m∗ of his choice with US as the credential issuer, UH as the credential
holder and UVi , i = 1, · · · , n, Vi 6= O as the designated verifiers such that m∗ has
never been queried for the credential result or m∗ has been queried but UO 6∈ L.
6. A can keep querying any messages and users but with the requirement that m∗
and UO cannot be queried together again.
7. Eventually, A will output a valid designated credential σ̂ on m∗ designated to
UO .
We define the success probability of A to win this experiment (i.e. to break LD-CMA
A
of limited credential scheme) as SuccLD−LCS−CM
(k) and the success probability of
A

any polynomially bounded adversary A is negligible. That is,
A
SuccLD−LCS−CM
(k) ≤ ²
A
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Implementation of Our Scheme

Our concrete construction of limited credential systems based on bilinear pairing is
defined as follows:
• Setup: Choose a security parameter k, which defines the length of prime number
q. Select the bilinear groups G1 and G2 of prime order q, where q = |G1 | = |G2 |.
Generate a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 , a generator P ∈ G1 together with
a cryptographic hash function H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 . Compose all of them into a
description string cp that specifies the common parameters (G1 , G2 , q, ê, P, H0 ).
R

• IKeyGen/HKeyGen/VKeyGen: Given cp, pick a random number xi ∈ Z∗q as ski
and compute pki = xi P . Let Ppub = pkS , where US is the credential issuer. The
secret/public key for the credential issuer is (skS , pkS ). The secret/public key for
the credential holder is (skH , pkH ) and the secret/public keys for the n verifiers
are (skj , pkj ), for j = 1, · · · , n.
• LCGen: Given cp, the credential issuer’s private key skS = xS and a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the credential issuer prepares a list L of limited designated verifiers
and their corresponding public keys pki = xi P, i = 1, · · · , n for the credential
holder with public key pkH = xH P . The credential issuer picks a random number
R

r ∈ Z∗q and computes S = r−1 xS H0 (m), R = rP, RH = rpkH , R1 = rpk1 , · · · ,
Rn = rpkn . The limited credential is a tuple (σ, L) = ({S, R, RH , R1 , · · · , Rn }, L).
(m, σ, L) is provided to the credential holder via a secure and authenticated
channel.

1

• LCVerify: Given cp, the credential issuer’s public key Ppub = xS P , the credential
holder’s private key skH = xH , a message m and a limited credential (σ, L) =
({S, R, RH , R1 , · · · , Rn }, L), return T rue iff
?

?

– ê(S, R) = ê(H0 (m), Ppub ) and ê(S, RH ) = ê(H0 (m), Ppub )skH hold with equality, and
?

– ê(Ri , P ) = ê(pki , R) holds ∀Ri , i : UVi ∈ L
Otherwise, return ⊥.
1

We note that the credential holder can always randomize this limited credential by computing
S = r0−1 S, R0 = r0 R, and ∀Ri0 = r0 Ri , i : UVi ∈ L, for r0 ∈ Z∗q . In some situation where we do
not allow this randomization to happen, then S is computed as S = r−1 xS H0 (m, R), and R will be
required as part of the LCDesignate algorithm.
0
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• LCDesignate: Given cp, a message m, a limited credential (σ, L), select a designated verifier from L, UVi ∈ L, and obtain UVi ’s public key pki . Pick the corresponding Ri value from σ according to i. Compute the designated credential
σ̂ = ê(S, Ri ). (m, σ̂) is sent to UVi .
• DLCVerify: Given cp, the credential issuer’s public key Ppub , the designated
verifier’s private key ski , a message m and a designated credential σ̂, return
?

T rue iff ê(H0 (m), Ppub )ski = σ̂ holds with equality. Otherwise, return ⊥.

6.3.1

Security Analysis

In this section, we show the security proofs for our scheme and show that our scheme
satisfies all the cryptographic requirements defined in section 6.2.2.
Correctness
The correctness of our scheme is justified as follows.
For the LCVerify algorithm,
ê(S, R) = ê(r−1 xS H0 (m), rP ) = ê(H0 (m), xS P )r·r
ê(S, RH ) = ê(r−1 xS H0 (m), rxH P ) = ê(H0 (m), xS P )r

−1

= ê(H0 (m), Ppub ) and

−1 ·r·x
H

= ê(H0 (m), Ppub )skH and

∀Ri , i : UVi ∈ L, ê(Ri , P ) = ê(rpki , P ) = ê(pki , rP ) = ê(pki , R)
For the DLCVerify algorithm,
σ̂ = ê(S, Ri ) = ê(r−1 xS H0 (m), rxi P ) = ê(H0 (m), xS P )r

−1 ·r·x
i

= ê(H0 (m), Ppub )ski

Non-Transferability
The transcript simulation for our scheme is defined as follows. Any designated verifier
UVi can compute a simulated designated credential as σ̂ = ê(H0 (m0 ), Ppub )ski on any
m0 6= m and DLCVerify algorithm will return T rue on σ̂. The simulated designated
credential is indistinguishable from the one that is produced by the credential holder
from a third party’s view. Thus only the designated verifier will be convinced by the
authenticity of the designated credential.
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Unforgeability
Let A be an UF-CMA adversary in the unforgeability experiment described in section
6.2.2. We will build a simulator B that will use A to solve an instance of the BDHP.
The purpose of B is to make use of A to compute ê(P, P )abc from (P, aP, bP, cP ) for
unknown a, b, c, which is given in the beginning of the experiment. The simulation is
described as follows:
R

1. B generates n + 1 random numbers ui ∈ Z∗q and computes ui cP as the public keys
pkH , pk1 , · · · , pkn of the credential holder and the designated verifiers. B sends
those public keys together with the description cp of common parameters and aP
as the public key pkS of the credential issuer to A.
2. Every time when A issues a hash query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qH of his
choice, B will answer the query as follows:
• B maintains a hash record [m, H(m), r, f ] to store all the hash results, it
grows as new hash result has replied.
• If the query on mi has not been asked before (and hence, it does not exist
R

in the record maintained by B), then B picks a random number ri ∈ Z∗q and
flips a {0, 1} coin that has probability α on outcome 0 and 1 − α on outcome
1. If 0 is obtained, B answers with H(mi ) = ri P . Otherwise, B answers
with H(mi ) = bP +ri P . B updates his record with (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ), where
fi ∈ {0, 1} is the result of the coin flipping.
• If the query on mi has been asked before, then B looks up his record to obtain
the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) and answers with the stored value H(mi ).
3. Every time when A issues a key generation query on any users Ui , i = 1, · · · , qK
of his choice, B will answer the query as follows:
• B maintains a key record [i, sk, pk] to store all the key pairs, it grows as new
key pair result has replied.
• If the query on Ui has not been asked before (and hence, it does not exist
R

in the record maintained by B), then B picks a random number ki ∈ Z∗q and
answers with (ski = ki , pki = ki P ). B updates his record with (i, ki , ki P )
• If the query on Ui has been asked before, then B looks up his record to
obtain the entry (i, ki , ki P ) and answers with the stored value (ki , ki P ).
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4. Every time when A issues a credential query on any message mi , i = 1, · · · , qC
and any public keys pkj , j = 1, · · · , n of his choice, B will answer the query as
follows:
• If the query on (mi , pkjS , pkjH , pkj1 , · · · , pkjn ) has not been asked before (and
hence, mi does not exist in the hash record maintained by B), then B picks
R

two random number ai , ri ∈ Z∗q and answers the query with (a−1
i ri pkjS , ai P ,
ai pkjH , ai pkj1 , · · · , ai pkjn ). B updates his hash record with (mi , ri P, ri , 0).
Note that ri pkjS = ri skjS P = skjS ri P = skjS H(mi ), which is equal to a
credential on mi generated with the private key corresponds to pkjS .
• If the query on (mi , pkjS , pkjH , pkj1 , · · · , pkjn ) where mi has been asked before, then B looks up on his hash record to find the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ).
If fi is found to be equal to 1 (i.e. H(mi ) = bP + ri P ), then B terminates and fails the simulation. Otherwise if fi is found to be equal to 0
R

(i.e. H(mi ) = ri P ), then B picks a random number ai ∈ Z∗q and returns
(a−1
i ri pkjS , ai P , ai pkjH , ai pkj1 , · · · , ai pkjn ) as the answer.
5. Eventually, A will output a forged limited credential (σ, L) = ({S, R, RH ,
R1 , · · · , Rn }, L) on m∗ . B needs to look up on his record to find the entry
(mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) where mi = m∗ (i.e.(m∗ , H(m∗ ), r∗ , f ∗ )). If m∗ has not been
queried (i.e. the entry is not found), then B terminates with failure. But since
the random values ri are randomly picked over Z∗q , thanks to its uniform randomness, the hash results are distributed over G1 and the probability that A
hits the hash result H(m∗ ) is

1
q

where q is a large prime, which is negligible.

Hence m∗ must have been queried during the hash queries (i.e. A has obtained
H(m∗ ) from B) and B is able to find the entry. In order to compute the answer
for the given instance to the BDHP, H(m∗ ) has to be in the form of bP + r∗ P
(i.e. f ∗ = 1). If it is not, B terminates and fails the simulation. Otherwise, B
selects any Rj value with the corresponding public key pkj = uj cP of any designated verifier or credential holder from the forged limited credential to calculate
−1

∗

ê(S, Rj )uj · ê(aP, cP )−r as the answer for the BDHP.
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If B does not terminate in the simulation, the answer computed by B is equal to :
−1

ê(S, Rj )uj · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

−1

= ê(aH(m∗ ), pkj )uj · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

−1

= ê(aH(m∗ ), uj cP )uj · ê(aP, cP )−r
= ê(a(bP + r∗ P ), cP ) · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

∗

= ê(abP + ar∗ P, cP ) · ê(−r∗ aP, cP )
= ê(P, P )abc
Hence B has successfully solved the BDHP for the given instance (P, aP , bP , cP ).
Note that the probability that B success is:
U F −LCS−CM A
P r[∀fi = 0 in P hase 4] × P r[f ∗ = 1 in P hase 5] × SuccA
(k)
U F −LCS−CM A
= αqC (1 − α)SuccA
(k)

In order to have a maximum probability of success, we take derivative on this value
U F −LCS−CM A
and found it is maximize at α = qC (qC + 1)−1 . Let β = SuccA
(k). Hence

B solves the BDHP with probability:
(qC (qC + 1)−1 )qC (1 − qC (qC + 1)−1 )β
β
qC qC
) (
)
= (
qC + 1
qC + 1
1
β
= (1 + )−qC (
)
qC
qC + 1
β
≥
e(qC + 1)
where e is the base for natural logarithm. In other words, B solved the BDHP with
non-negligible probability, which contradicts with the BDHP assumption. Hence, we
complete the proof.
Limitability
As defined in section 6.2.2, we use the LD-CMA experiment to proof this property.
As in the unforgeability proof, we let A be a LD-CMA adversary in the limitability
experiment described in section 6.2.2. We will build a simulator B that will use A
to solve an instance of the BDHP. The purpose of B is to make use of A to compute
ê(P, P )abc from (P, aP, bP, cP ) for unknown a, b, c, which is given in the beginning of
the experiment. The simulation is described as follows:
1-4. The same as phase 1-4 in the UF-CMA experiment.
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5. At some stage, A will nominate a designated verifier UO within the verifiers given
by B in phase 1 that he would like to corrupt and ask for the credential (σ, L) on
any m∗ of his choice with US as the credential issuer, UH as the credential holder
and UVi , i = 1, · · · , n, Vi 6= O as the designated verifiers such that m∗ has never
been queried for the credential result or m∗ has been queried but UO 6∈ L. B will
then follow the way he replies the queries in phase 4 to reply A with the required
credential (σ, L).
6. A can keep querying any m∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and any users of his choice, with one
condition that m∗ and UO cannot be queried together again.
7. Eventually, A will output a valid designated credential σ̂ on m∗ designated to UO .
In order to compute the answer for the given instance to the BDHP, B finds the
corresponding public key uO cP of UO and the entry (mi , H(mi ), ri , fi ) where mi =
−1

m∗ (i.e.(m∗ , H(m∗ ), r∗ , f ∗ )) in his hash record, then calculates σ̂ uO · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

as the answer for the BDHP.
If B does not terminate in the simulation, the answer computed by B is equal to :
−1

σ̂ uO · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

−1

= ê(aH(m∗ ), pkO )uO · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

−1

= ê(aH(m∗ ), uO cP )uO · ê(aP, cP )−r
= ê(a(bP + r∗ P ), cP ) · ê(aP, cP )−r

∗

∗

= ê(abP + ar∗ P, cP ) · ê(−r∗ aP, cP )
= ê(P, P )abc
Following the computation in the UF-CMA experiment, B has successfully solved the
BDHP for the given instance (P, aP , bP , cP ) with the same non-negligible probability
of success that contradicts with the BDHP assumption. Hence, we complete our proof.

6.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we defined a new notion called Limited Credential Systems. Our notion
allows a credential issuer to issue a credential to a credential holder, such that the
credential holder can only convince a group of verifiers that have been predetermined
by the credential issuer. The scheme is based on bilinear pairing and we provided a
security proof for it.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
Starting from chapter 4 to chapter 6, we have presented our contributions to securing
wireless ad-hoc networks. The two main goals in this thesis are: 1. Create encryption/decryption schemes for wireless ad-hoc network users, such that they can build
up a secure communication channel. 2. Create digital signature schemes for wireless
ad-hoc network users, such that they can authenticate each others’ origins. We have
successfully achieved these two goals with our new cryptographic schemes and we will
summaries our contributions in each chapter below.
In chapter 4, we presented our encryption/decryption schemes for wireless ad-hoc
networks, which was the first contribution to securing wireless ad-hoc networks that had
been done during this research. We put our focus on extending broadcast encryption
schemes from 1-to-many communication to many-to-many communication, rather than
following the majority to extend the DH public key exchange protocol from two parties
into multi parties. The resulting encryption/decryption scheme that we created by
incorporating the ID-based cryptosystem [63], bilinear map and pairing [15] together
with the single encryption and multiple decryption method [53] was a success. It
fulfills availability, confidentiality and integrity requirements, it is also cost effective.
The ”fairness” problem in wireless ad-hoc network is also solved. Still, there are some
more works that can be done. For example, this is not an authenticated encryption
scheme. This means that sender of a message can not be traced. In other words, every
group members can broadcast any information without taking any responsibility. We
did not make the encrypted message authentical, this was why we created another
signature schemes to fix this flaw.
In chapter 5, we presented our first digital signature scheme for wireless ad-hoc
networks. We had this idea to extend UDVS [69] into a multi version at the time we
were searching for an authentication scheme for the group members to decide if someone
is allowed to join their group. The resulting UDMVS scheme fulfills the authenticity
requirement and is cost effective. However, once a signature is transformed into a
63
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designated signature, all the designated verifiers have to participate in the verification
process, such that the signature can be authenticated. This is not flexible and some
future works like creating a threshold version of it can be a possible research topic.
Finally, we presented our second digital signature scheme that we called limited
credential system. It dues with a situation that when users want more control on
who can be the signature verifier. Different from UDMVS, where the signature holder
has total control on the choice of verifiers; limited credential system has removed
this freedom from signature holder and gives the control back to the signature signer
(issuer). As the wireless ad-hoc networks environment becomes more complicated,
cryptographic schemes tailored for particular situations are needed. Recently, Rui et
al. [81] have constructed an UDVS scheme without using random oracles. Their scheme
is based on the short signatures without random oracles from Boneh and Boyen in [14].
We aware that a variant of their random oracles removal constructions can be employed
to generate a limited credential system without random oracles.
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[62] C. Schwingenschlögl and M. P. Horn. Building Blocks for Secure Communication
in Ad-Hoc Networks. In European Wireless, 2002.
[63] A. Shamir. Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes. In Advances
in Cryptology - Crypto 1984, volume 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 47–53. Springer-Verlag, 1984.
[64] S. Singh. The Code Book. Fourth Estate Limited, 2000.
[65] N. P. Smart. An Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Based
on the Weil Pairing. In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2001/111, 2001.
[66] F. Stajano. The Resurrecting Duckling - What Next? In International Workshop
on Security Protocols, volume 2133 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
204–214. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[67] F. Stajano and R. J. Anderson. The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for AdHoc Wireless Networks. In International Workshop on Security Protocols, volume
1796 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 172–194. Springer-Verlag, 2000.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

71

[68] M. Steiner, G. Tsudik, and M. Waidner. Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution Extended
to Group Communication. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 31–37, 1996.
[69] R. Steinfeld, L. Bull, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk. Universal Designated-Verifier
Signatures. In Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt 2003, volume 2894 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 523–542. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[70] R. Steinfeld, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk.

Efficient Extension of Standard

Schnorr/RSA Signatures into Universal Designated-Verifier Signatures. In Public
Key Cryptography 2004, volume 2947 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
86–100. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[71] A. S. Tanenbaum. Computer Networks. Prentice Hall, 2003.
[72] The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks

(MANET). http://www.ietf.org.
[73] U.S. Marconi Museum. http://www.marconiusa.org.
[74] P. Vinayakray-Jani. Security within Ad Hoc Networks. In Pioneering Advanced
Mobile Privacy and Security Workshop, 2002.
[75] D. Wallner, E. Harder, and R. Agee. Key Management for Multicast: Issues and
Architectures. RFC 2627, 1999.
[76] G. Wang. An Attack on Not-Interactive Designated Verifier Proofs for Undeniable
Signatures. In Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/243, 2003.
[77] Wi-Fi Alliance. http://www.wi-fi.org.
[78] S. Xhu and M. Yung. k-anonymous Secret Handshakes with Reusable Credentials.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 158–167,
2004.
[79] G. Yao, K. Ren, F. Bao, R. H. Deng, and D. Feng. Making the Key Agreement
Protocol in Mobile Ad Hoc Network More Efficient. In Applied Cryptography
and Network Security, volume 2846 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
343–356. Springer-Verlag, 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

72

[80] F. Zhang and K. Kim. A Universal Forgery on Araki et al.’s Convertible Limited
Verifier Signature Scheme. In IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals, volume E86A, No.2, pages 515–516, 2003.
[81] R. Zhang, J. Furukawa, and H. Imai. Short Signature and Universal Designated
Verifier Signature without Random Oracles. In Applied Cryptography and Network
Security 2005, volume 3531 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 483–498.
Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[82] L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas. Securing Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Network Magazine,
13(6):24–30, 1999.

